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State law gives corporate managers extremely broad power to
direct increasingly large pools of collective business assets. Not
surprisingly, economic incentives, norms, markets, and law all work to
constrain the breadth of the power and the potential for abuse of what
is other people's money.' State corporate law has occupied the center
stage in the legal portion of this landscape, with federal securities law
playing a supporting role-at least in the academic presentation of the
debate. The New Deal's securities legislation eschewed a general
federal corporations statute in favor of a more focused federal role
emphasizing disclosure and antifraud protections for those who
purchase and sell securities. 2 The Supreme Court has made clear that
"fraud" as proscribed in federal law was not to be defined in a way
that annexed corporate governance.3 And, in 1995, Congress expressed
a clear desire to limit the use of federal securities fraud lawsuits, at
least insofar as those lawsuits were perceived to be frivolous. 4
Yet, as this Article demonstrates, federal securities law and
enforcement via securities fraud class actions today have become the
most visible means of regulating corporate governance. Securities
fraud law is ostensibly directed at buyers and sellers of securities, 5 but
1. See, e.g., William Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 667, 671 (1974) ("Such confidence [by private investors entrusting funds to public
companies] can be sustained only by a combination of high standards coupled with disclosure
and management accountability coupled with vulnerability to derivative or direct shareholder
action.").
2. See JAMES COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION, CASES AND MATERIALS 7 (3d ed. 2001),
('"The Securities Act's exclusive orientation was disclosure, a clear victory for those who
embraced a less intrusive role in capital markets.") (citing James M. Landis, The Legislative
History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29, 34 (1959)).
3. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478-79 (1977) (overturning lower court
opinion that defined Rule 10b-5 to include constructive fraud, the unfair misuse of authority by a
fiduciary: "Absent a clear indication of congressional intent we are reluctant to federalize the
substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals with transactions in securities,
particularly where established state policies of corporate regulation would be overridden.").
4. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act § 101(b), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(1995) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 74u-4(b) (2000)).
5. Rule 10b-5, the primary federal antifraud vehicle, applies to fraud "in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security," see 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2001), and the Supreme Court
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in the context of class actions, this purchaser-seller connection acts
more like the minimalist jurisdictional hook of the interstate
commerce requirement than a real constraint on the use of securities
law to regulate corporate governance. 6 Federal securities law is, of
course, not the only legal constraint on managerial behavior, and a
shareholder lawsuit based on disclosure is not the only litigation
remedy. State law continues to provide the legal skeleton for the
corporate form, and state fiduciary duty litigation continues as a
mechanism frequently utilized to monitor managers. Yet, in today's
world, state law does so almost entirely in two contexts-acquisitions
and self-dealing transactions. The empirical evidence in this Article
illustrates that corporate governance outside of these areas has passed
to federal law and in particular to shareholder litigation under Rule
10b-5.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, passed by Congress in the
wake of numerous corporate accountability scandals, provides new
evidence of the expanded role of federal law.7 The move to federal
corporate governance, however, is broader than that law and has a
longer history than the current scandals. The ascendancy of federal
law in corporate governance reflects at least three factors. First,
disclosure has become the most important method to regulate
corporate managers, and disclosure has been predominantly a federal,
rather than a state, methodology. Second, state law has focused
largely on the duties and liabilities of directors, and not those of
officers. Yet, officers have become the fulcrum of governance in today's
corporations, and federal law has increasingly occupied the space
defining the duties and liabilities of officers. Third, federal
shareholder litigation based on securities fraud has several practical
advantages over state shareholder litigation based on fiduciary duty
that have contributed to the greater use of the federal forum. As a
result of these trends, federal law now occupies the largest part of the
has ruled that a private cause of action under that rule accrues only to one who is a purchaser or
seller of securities. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730-45 (1975).
6. Corporate law is not one of the enumerated powers given the federal government in the
Constitution, and its presence as a subject of federal law turns on the interstate commerce power
of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. The securities laws passed in President Franklin
Roosevelt's first term went to some length to bring the acts within interstate commerce,
reflecting concern that the Supreme Court of that era would strike down federal legislation not
connected to interstate commerce. Although the current Supreme Court has indicated some
willingness to find federal acts insufficiently connected to interstate commerce, see United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995), the activities of our largest corporations seem well within the
federal range of interests, and a very tangential connection to interstate commerce will satisfy
the constitutional requirement.
7. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §§ 101-109, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7211-7219 (West, WESTLAW
through Pub. L. No. 107-377) [hereinafter Sarbanes-Oxley Act].
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legal corporate governance infrastructure in the twenty-first century.
The outpouring of suggested reforms that have followed in the wake of
the Enron and WorldCom scandals have focused on federal law and on
the conduct of officers and directors, rather than on state law, which
in practice focuses mainly on directors. Indeed, the discussions about
reforms have excluded state law almost entirely.8
In this Article, we develop the idea of federal law as corporate
governance in three parts organized around history, empirical data,
and analysis. In Part I, we begin with the traditional legal template.
State corporate law is the focus, and federal securities law plays a
supporting role. We discuss the history of the two sources of law and
some of the dramatic changes that have occurred through the impact
of federal disclosure law on corporate governance.
8. There has been some focus on the failure of the board's oversight, as in the Senate
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations report, The Role of the Board of Directors in Enron's
Collapse, but that report makes recommendations only to directors, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, and self-regulatory agencies, like the national stock exchanges, without any
discussion of possible changes in state law. See S. REP. No. 107-70, at 4 (2002). Moreover, these
discussions are federal discussions about state law, not state-level discussions about state law.
In contrast, compare the corporate governance changes made in 2002 outside of state law:
* Federal law has created a new accounting regulatory system that federalizes most of
the regulation of those who monitor financial information presented to shareholders.
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 101-109, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7211-19.
" Federal law requires CEOs and CFOs to certify that disclosure reports fairly present
the financial condition and results of operations of the company. See Sarbanes-Oxley
Act § 401(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7261(b). This followed SEC action pursuant to its
investigatory powers that required the top officers of almost one thousand companies to
certify their financial results.
" The New York Stock Exchange has proposed changes to its listing requirements to
require greater director independence. See NYSE Approves Measures to Strengthen
Corporate Accountability, at http://www.nyse.com/content.articles/NTO0056F8D4.html
(last visited Jan. 30, 2003).
" NASDAQ has put forth changes to its listing requirements, requiring boards to have a
majority of independent directors and directors to meet without company management.
Nasdaq to Toughen Company Standards, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2002, at C6.
" Federal legislation requires officers to report stock transactions with their companies
immediately. Previously they did not need to be reported until the end of the company's
fiscal year. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 403, 15 U.S.C.A § 78(p).
" The SEC has proposed a dramatically increased number of events that must be
immediately reported via Form 8-K. Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and
Acceleration of Filing Date, 67 Fed. Reg. 42914 (June 25, 2002) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 240 & 249) and Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 409, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78(m)(1)
(containing a congressional mandate for additional real-time disclosure).
" The SEC has approved accelerating the date by which annual and quarterly reports
are due. Acceleration of Periodic Filing Dates and Disclosure Concerning Website
Access to Reports, SEC Release No. 33-8128 (Sept. 5, 2002) (final rule), at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33.8128.htm; see Acceleration of Periodic Report Filing
Dates and Disclosure Concerning Website Access to Reports, 67 Fed. Reg. 19895
(proposed Apr. 23, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts 229, 240 & 249).
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In Part II, we present empirical data on the use of both federal
and state litigation to regulate corporate governance. We begin with a
data set we have developed of securities fraud class action complaints
filed in 1999. 9 Our analysis of those complaints shows that securities
fraud class action litigation is being used mostly in areas that relate to
the managers' operation of the business. Not surprisingly, for
example, many of the complaints raise concerns about the ways in
which managers have recognized revenues or engaged in some form of
accounting manipulation. From that base, we expand the story using
data developed by others on securities fraud class actions more
generally. We then compare transactions that give rise to securities
fraud claims to another data set that covers all corporate cases filed in
the Delaware Chancery Court for that same year. 10 The result is a
surprisingly narrow focus for state litigation and a much broader one
for federal suits, revealing a gap in the standard learning about
corporate governance. In Part III, we address how the federal
securities fraud picture we provide might fit with state shareholder
litigation in a current theory of corporate governance.
Although previously unexplored in any detail in the academic
literature, federal securities fraud litigation operates much like state
fiduciary duty litigation in policing corporate governance.11 To be sure,
the federal claims continue to reflect the requirement that the plaintiff
be a purchaser or seller of a security.1 2 But the protracted length of
9. Our database contains complaints in securities fraud class action suits that were filed in
the Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits during that year. The suits filed
in those circuits reflect about half of all securities fraud class action suits filed in that year, and
we believe that they are representative of all securities class action suits filed during that year
and since the 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. The 2001 class action data, for
example, reflect a large jump in the number of securities fraud class actions, reflecting a surge in
suits related to investment bankers placing new offerings with favored customers.
10. Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation:
Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming) (2003) (reporting on all
fiduciary cases filed in Delaware in 1999 and 2000-more than one thousand cases).
11. Few academic commentators have focused on the important role that securities law
plays in regulating the day-to-day governance of our corporations. The most detailed argument
for this view has been made by Joel Seligman, whose corporations casebook reflects such a theme
and who, in other writings, has recognized the paucity of corporate law, particularly in the duty
of care context. See Joel Seligman, The New Corporate Law, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (1993). He also
advocated that Congress create a federal law of care, specifically eliminating the use of special
litigation committees. See Joel Seligman, The Case for Federal Minimum Corporate Law
Standards, 49 MD. L. REV. 947, 973 (1990). Others have advocated the use of federal corporate
law as a mechanism to address the atrophy of state corporate law, though they have largely
focused on the duty of care. See, e.g., Cary, supra note 1, at 701-02. Still others have documented
the increasing presence of securities law and its influence on the corporate structure, but without
focusing on the gap that we posit it is filling. See, e.g., Arthur Fleischer, Jr., "Federal
Corporations Law" An Assessment, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1146, 1146-48 (1965).
12. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730-45 (1975).
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most class periods means that the class includes a substantial
percentage of the shareholder body. And, the small amount per share
of each recovery makes the incentives look similar to traditional
corporate derivative and class litigation, including the importance of
lawyers as repeat players. We conclude that in this common universe,
state fiduciary duty litigation, with its amorphous focus on directors'
failure to monitor officers and other parts of the enterprise, is at a
systematic disadvantage relative to federal law which, in a more
focused way, seeks to explore what officers need to do to meet their
corporate disclosure obligations.
I. THE TRADITIONAL TEMPLATE
A. State Law-Combating Agency Costs When Managers Control
Other People's Money
As created by state law, corporations are a business form based
on specialization of function and centralized control. At the core of
corporations law is what we discuss here as corporate governance, the
relative allocation of power in the collective entity among three groups
of participants named by the statute: shareholders, directors, and
officers. 13 This allocation of power defines the nature of the
relationship between these participants and their role in determining
the direction, strategy, and policy of the corporate entity and,
ultimately, its performance. The term "corporate governance," then,
incorporates all of these relationships and issues.
The starting point for American corporations statutes is clear:
Corporate power is exercised by or under the direction of the board of
directors. 14 In reality, officers exercise the most important corporate
powers, 15 but in legal theory they are clearly subordinate to the board
and are barely mentioned in most corporations statutes. 16 Indeed,
13. There are of course other stakeholders of the corporation not named in the statute.
Employees, for example, are key stakeholders and are part of corporate statutes in other
countries such as Germany, where there is a supervisory board on which labor populates half of
the seats.
14. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (providing that all corporate power "shall be
managed by or under the direction of a board of directors").
15. See Alan Greenspan, Excerpts from Report by Greenspan at Senate, N.Y. TIMES, July 17,
2002, at C8 ("Our vast and highly liquid financial markets enable large institutional
shareholders to sell their shares when they perceive inadequacies of corporate governance,
rather than fix them. This has placed de facto control in the hands of the chief executive officer.")
16. Section 142 refers to officers, but the statute defers almost completely to a corporation's
bylaws or board resolutions as to what officers might do, how they are chosen, and how vacancies
are filled, except for minimal default provisions, such as the provision that officers may resign at
any time. Section 143 addresses loans to employees and officers, and section 145 includes
[Vol. 56:859864
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more sections of corporation law codes are directed to the role of
shareholders, the default owners of the corporation, than to officers.
Shareholders vote, sell, and sue, although each action occurs only in
carefully measured doses that, even collectively, do not change the
ultimate control of the corporation.17 As far as the law is concerned,
directors are the key players. Accordingly, most of corporate
governance as it has developed at the state level focuses on defining
the duties and responsibilities of directors and the relative rights of
shareholders to constrain director action.
The law, then, both centralizes corporate decisionmaking
power in the board and provides constraints against possible misuses
of that power. The most important state law constraint is fiduciary
duty, which comes in three flavors-care, loyalty, and good faith.
These fiduciary duties provide individual shareholders with a means
to seek ex post judicial review of managerial and directorial actions,
one of the many checks on the exercise of power in the corporate
governance relationship. The practical constraints on shareholder
voting and selling in modern public corporations, commonly discussed
as collective action problems, left fiduciary duty litigation as the
principal legal check on centralized corporate authority during the
twentieth century.
The fiduciary duty of care requires that managers perform
their duties with sufficient attention and care. As developed at
common law, the duty grew out of law borrowed from the law of trust
and then from tort law.' 8 For many years, the courts described this
duty in a manner that appeared to hold directors and other managers
to a negligence standard. This duty is, however, accompanied by the
business judgment rule. That rule is a judicially applied presumption
of correctness that effectively shields directors from liability for all but
the most egregious decisions.19
officers, along with directors and others, as persons whom the corporation may indemnify. The
Model Business Corporation Act goes further, including a section setting standards of conduct for
officers. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.42 (2002). This section is less extensive than that
provided for directors. The official comment observes that "deficient performance of duties by an
officer ... will normally be dealt with through intracorporate disciplinary procedures... [and] in
some cases, failure to observe relevant standards of conduct can give rise to an officer's liability
to the corporation or its shareholders." § 8.42, cmt.
17. Robert B. Thompson, Preemption and Federalism in Corporate Governance: Protecting
Shareholder Rights to Vote, Sell, and Sue, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215, 216 (1999).
18. Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality,
22 BUS. LAW. 35 (1966).
19. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
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The well-known 1985 Delaware decision of Smith v. Van
Gorkom20 created a firestorm of discussion.21 Most commentators
argued that the Delaware Supreme Court had expanded the realm of
director liability in the care setting by allowing a case to survive
business judgment rule review when the officers and directors had not
explicitly engaged in a loyalty violation. According to the court, bad
acts amounting to gross negligence brought judicial oversight of the
transaction.22 The reaction to that case resulted in legislation in all
but a handful of states allowing shareholders to adopt, but not,
ironically, to recommend or to rescind, provisions to insulate directors
for violations of their fiduciary duty of care. 23 Absent violations of
loyalty, good faith, or some intent to harm the corporation or its
shareholders, directors are now exculpated from private monetary
liability for failures to adhere to their duty of care.24 As a result, this
aspect of the shareholders' corporate governance role was significantly
diminished.
Loyalty and good faith, then, remain the only significant bases
for a claim asserting a breach of fiduciary duty. Loyalty claims fall
mostly into the category of cases involving self-dealing transactions
between the corporation and one of its managers. Other claims include
taking a corporate opportunity and various self-dealing allegations.
Insider trading, a long-standing example of insider breach of fiduciary
duty under state law, has effectively been ceded to federal law through
Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission" or "SEC")
enforcement actions and, occasionally, through individual and class
action claims brought under sections 10(b) 25 and 20A26 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the SEC's Rule 10b-5.2 7 The duty
20. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
21. For a discussion of the impact of Van Gorkom, see the recent symposium in the
Northwestern Law Review. Symposium, Van Gorkom and the Corporate Board: Problem,
Solution, or Placebo?, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 449 (2002).
22. 488 A.2d at 864, 867-69 (directors approved the sale of the company at a two-hour
meeting, without advance notice and without seeing the final written agreement).
23. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001).
24. The Delaware statute and similar provisions in the Model Business Corporation Act
permit liability for intentional wrongdoing by directors. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.02(b)4-5
(2002).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000).
26. § 78t-1.
27. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2002); see LoUIS LoSS, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES
REGULATION 823 (1983) (stating that Rule 10b-5 has transformed the traditional state law
"minority rule" into "the law of the land").
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of good faith has undergone recent common law development, but its
role remains unclear. 28
The expanded role of disclosure in the growth of federal law as
a monitor of corporate governance is discussed more fully below, but a
brief word is in order here as to the role of disclosure in state
corporate law. Most state corporation statutes impose few mandatory
disclosure obligations. Delaware, for example, permits shareholders to
inspect stock ledgers, minute books, and books of account, when a
proper purpose is alleged. 29 Although shareholders have the right to
see what management has said in those documents, Delaware law
does not require that the information be delivered to shareholders.
Nor does it opine as to the content of the information to be
maintained. 30
Indeed, the Delaware Supreme Court has often discussed
content largely in the context of the federal law, referring, for
example, to potential violations of good faith for managements' failure
to disclose information properly in a federally required proxy
statement. 31 Delaware's common law, as developed by its chancery
court and supreme court, has sometimes required disclosure as a
condition for directors to satisfy their fiduciary duty, for example in
seeking to cleanse a self-dealing situation. 32
Misleading disclosure can give rise to a state cause of action for
one of the sporadic actions for which Delaware law permits
shareholder participation. Direct state-law liability for misleading
statements in nonvoting cases, however, is presently limited. To date,
the only significant Delaware decision on point is Malone v. Brincat.33
Presumably, this case was filed under state law because federal
securities causes of action are restricted to purchasers and sellers,
28. See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (2000) (noting existence of duty of good faith in
Delaware jurisprudence and applying duty in context of executive compensation decision).
29. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 219(c)-220 (2001). Access to books and records is a heavily
litigated issue. See, e.g., Conservative Caucus v. Chevron Corp., 525 A.2d 569, 570 (1987)
(describing a situation in which the plaintiff was forced to litigate its right to the shareholder
list). See generally Randall S. Thomas, Improving Shareholder Monitoring of Corporate
Management by Expanding Statutory Access to Information, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 331, 334 (1996)
(describing the use of inspection statutes).
30. Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 332-33 (Del. Ch. 1997) (Allen, C.) (commenting that
disclosure is left to federal law where there is more expertise: "An administrative agency-the
Securities and Exchange Commission-has a technical staff, is able to hold public hearings, and
can, thus, receive wide and expert input, and can specify forms of disclosure, if appropriate.").
31. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 890-93 (Del. 1985).
32. See, e.g., Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc., 673 A.2d 148, 158 n.10 (Del. 1996) (noting that
the prophylactic effect of disclosure through formal board approval could have prevented
litigation of corporate opportunity case).
33. 722 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998).
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which the plaintiffs were not, leaving the shareholders to search for a
state law remedy in a case involving allegations of significant
corporate fraud. In Malone, the Delaware Supreme Court made clear
that misleading disclosures to shareholders could be a basis for a
fiduciary duty cause of action.34 But Delaware case law35 and the
preemptive effects of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards
Act3 6 effectively limit the remedy to those few situations in which the
law expressly provides for collective action by shareholders.
In corporate governance terms, Delaware has chosen to focus
on directors as the fulcrum of corporate governance. Delaware law is
distinctive for its emphasis on directors and its preference for allowing
the markets and private ordering, as opposed to law, to regulate (or
not regulate) how directors use that power. It does not require
independent directors, except as a basis for cleansing conflict of
interest transactions; it does not require disclosure, except in the
sporadic circumstances in which shareholders are asked to vote;37 it
does not require monitoring by independent accountants, even though
the New York Stock Exchange does. Instead, under Delaware
corporate law, corporations are free to adopt any or all of these
requirements if their directors believe those devices might benefit the
corporation. The power of shareholders to respond to such director
decisions is relatively limited. More particularly, Delaware has
abandoned most legal controls on the manager's duty of care, again
leaving that to private ordering. 38 As a result, as Alan Greenspan said
recently, when "[a]n infectious greed seemed to grip much of our
business community... [olur historical guardians of financial
information were overwhelmed." 39 And, shareholders had federal
34. Id. at 9.
35. Delaware does not recognize "fraud on the market" as a way to meet the reliance
requirement for fraud and more generally limits the effectiveness of class actions for disclosure
claims outside of voting. See Malone, 722 A.2d at 13-14.
36. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77p(f)(2) (2000)) (preempting most class actions involving
nationally traded securities but providing a Delaware carve-out preserving corporate claims
traditionally heard in state courts such as derivative suits, class actions relating to purchase or
sale by the issuer from its equityholders, or transactions requiring shareholder approval).
37. The Delaware Supreme Court has suggested a broader disclosure duty: "Whenever
directors communicate publicly or directly with shareholders about the corporation's affairs, with
or without a request for shareholder action, directors have a fiduciary duty to shareholders."
Malone, 722 A.2d at 10. However, there is little indication, including in all of the contexts
described in Part II of this Article, that Delaware is moving to provide a remedy outside of
requests for shareholder action. See generally Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Calling off the Lynch
Mob: The Corporate Director's Fiduciary Disclosure Duty, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1087 (1996).
38. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001).
39. Greenspan, supra note 15, at C8.
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disclosure mechanisms, but not effective state law, to pursue claims of
wrongdoing.
B. Federal Law
Calls for bringing corporate law into the realm of federal
regulation were vocalized almost from the beginning of general
incorporation statutes and the first widespread use of the corporate
form for large publicly held businesses. Shortly after taking office,
President Theodore Roosevelt asserted a need for government control
over corporations as part of his trust-busting effort. 40 His proposed
legislation for making this regulation federal in nature was repeated
by two subsequent Presidents, although it was not enacted by the
Congress in any of those administrations. 41
The government response to the excesses of the 1920s and to
the pain of the Great Depression again led to calls for federal
corporations law, but the New Deal Congress that passed securities
legislation in 1933 and 1934 chose less intrusive means. The
Securities Act of 1933 (the "1933 Act") and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (the "1934 Act," together, the "Acts") focus on protecting
the integrity of the markets both by demanding that specific
documents exist and by requiring that, when made, all disclosures be
complete and accurate. The litigation remedies based on fraud
connected to the sale of securities might suggest a departure from the
core of corporate governance. This Article presents evidence
suggesting otherwise.
1. The Original Focus: Disclosure in the Purchase or Sale of
Securities and Sporadic Shareholder Governance Actions
The 1933 Act focuses on the issuance of securities and,
particularly, the initial pubic offering. Initial public offerings present
the most significant form of informational asymmetry that the New
Deal legislation attempts to address. Issuers are selling securities to
noninsiders who may know little or nothing about the company. It is a
form of insider trading, but unlike the traditional form, this version is
publicly disclosed. To address this informational imbalance and to
prevent the sale of bad securities, or even securities in companies that
40. Theodore Roosevelt, First Annual Message (Dec. 3, 1901), in 15 THE WORKS OF
THEODORE ROOSEVELT 81, 92 (Herman Hagedorn ed., 1926) ("The nation should, without
interfering with the power of the States in the matter itself, also assume power of supervision
and regulation over all corporations doing an interstate business.").
41. Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, 1 SECURITIES REGULATION 154-56 (1989).
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do not exist, the 1933 Act requires that all offering documents conform
to specific requirements and that all disclosures be true and accurate.
Obviously, the informational asymmetry diminishes over time as
publicly held companies release regular reports, 42 but depending on
the nature and timing of an offering-for example, a shelf offering-
the asymmetry problem can still be quite significant. 43
The regulatory baseline is to require extensive disclosure
(absent an exemption) before companies or others seek money from
investors. In addition, the 1933 Act charges other parties-for
example, underwriters, investment bankers, and accountants-with
specific due diligence responsibilities. 44 These market gatekeepers
enable companies to make offerings and, therefore, are charged with
the responsibility of preventing fraudulent offerings. If they do their
jobs correctly, the gatekeepers monitor the accuracy of issuer
representations, ensuring accurate pricing of the securities to be
offered and accurate issuer information at the time of the offering.
In contrast, the 1934 Act focuses on disclosures that take place
after the company's stock is publicly traded. Here, the approach is not
one focused on regulating the gatekeepers who are supposed to
monitor the companies, but on ensuring that when a public company
speaks, it does so truthfully. Disclosure, again, is the primary focus.
Statutorily, the most significant and direct extension into the
corporate governance realm occurs when managers or others solicit
proxies to gain shareholder votes as may be required by state law.
State and federal law interact in the proxy context, jointly regulating
the means and ends of management-to-shareholder communications. 45
Ostensibly, the federal proxy statutes and rules are deferential
to state corporate law. The federal realm does not determine the
rights of shareholders within the corporate governance structure.
Instead, federal law regulates the process of disclosure-deferring to
state law to designate when shareholder participation is required or
appropriate. Largely, then, federal law's role is to require that
whenever such disclosures occur, they are full and complete.
Despite its ostensible deference to state law, the role of federal
law in this area has grown substantially. As originally enacted, the
42. See id. at n.345.
43. See Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1200 (1st Cir. 1996) (discussing
informational asymmetry that occurred when company did offering three weeks before quarter
ended and later filed quarterly report revealing the company's financial concerns).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2000).
45. See Hillary A. Sale, Of Corporate Suffrage, Social Responsibility, and Layered Law:
Teaching Basic Business Law Through Federal Securities Law, 34 GA. L. REV. 809, 815-17 (2000)
(discussing interaction of state and federal law in proxy context).
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1934 Act required disclosure triggered by proxy solicitation in only the
largest set of companies. 46 The 1964 amendments expanded the proxy
disclosure requirements to all publicly held companies. 47 Then, in
1968, the Williams Act analogized shareholder tender offer decisions
to shareholder proxy solicitation decisions and required similar
disclosures in a tender offer setting.48  Subsequent judicial
interpretations of the proxy laws have extended federal protection to
shareholder decisions as to whether to seek an appraisal remedy
under state law.49
These federal rules perform two significant and reciprocal
functions. First, they enhance the opportunities for shareholders to
exercise their corporate governance role. Second, they impose
substantial limits on those who control the corporations. Their impact,
however, is limited in two significant ways. First, the federal rules
explicitly defer to state law. For example, Rule 14a-8 permits
shareholders to initiate agenda items for a shareholders' meeting50
and arguably expands the shareholder role beyond that provided by
state corporate law, but it is limited to matters that the Commission
finds appropriate for shareholder determination under state law. 51
Second, the proxy provisions usually take effect only when state law
requires shareholder decisionmaking. The sporadic nature of that
decisionmaking, then, is the trigger for federal involvement and,
thereby, its role.
46. Section 14 applies to companies required to register under section 12 of the 1934 Act,
which originally applied to companies traded on a national securities exchange.
47. See 15 U.S.C. § 771(g) (2000) (added by the 1964 Amendments and phasing in the
disclosure requirements to apply first to companies with 750 shareholders or more and at least
$1 million in assets and then to companies of the same size with 500 or more shareholders). By
SEC rule, the dollar minimum has been increased to $10 million, to reflect some of the changes
caused by inflation. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (2002).
48. See 113 CONG. REC. 854 (1967) ("[T]he need for such legislation has been caused by the
increased use of cash tender offers rather than the regular proxy fight to gain control of publicly-
owned corporations .... This legislation will close a significant gap in investor protection under
the federal securities laws .. ") (remarks of Senator Williams); see also S. REP. No. 90-550, at 2,
4 (1967), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2811, 2814.
49. Wilson v, Great Am. Indus., Inc. 979 F.2d 924 (2d Cir. 1992) (providing an example of a
cause of action where disclosure was said to have affected a shareholder decision to give up
appraisal rights).
50. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2002).
51. See, e.g., N.Y. City Employees' Ret. Sys. v. SEC, 45 F.3d 7 (2d Cir. 1995) (discussing the
changing nature of the Commission's stand concerning when shareholders can require companies
to place matters on proxy for shareholder consideration).
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2. The Expanded Federal Focus: Continuous Disclosure and
Corporate Governance
Other sections of the 1934 Act provide the foundation for a
more expansive federal role in corporate governance. The two most
prominent mechanisms are the periodic disclosure requirements
under section 13 and the antifraud provisions and concomitant
liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. We use the term
disclosure here as broadly as the regulations and the case law have
provided, referring to all types: mandatory, voluntary, and, in some
cases, silence.
These disclosure mechanisms have also expanded since 1934,
and, thereby, again expanded the role of federal law in corporate
governance. Unlike the proxy requirements, however, these provisions
are not linked to sporadic shareholder action, such as voting. Instead,
the trigger for standing to sue in these cases requires only that
shareholders purchase or sell shares in a company. 52 Purchase and
sale decisions, of course, occur continuously in larger enterprises
where there is a developed market for shares. These provisions, then,
create a much broader mechanism for asserting the shareholders' role
in corporate governance and for requiring a more active role for
officers and others in corporate governance-even if directors have not
chosen or do not wish to allocate such power to shareholders or
officers.
a. The Dramatic Increase in Mandatory Disclosure
In the years since 1934, mandatory disclosure regulation has
expanded. For example, pursuant to the authority Congress delegated
in the 1934 Act, the Securities and Exchange Commission
promulgated regulations requiring large public companies to make
disclosures in annual and quarterly reports with increasing amounts
of information required to be disclosed between these periods on a
real-time basis.53 In 1964, Congress extended this provision, like the
52. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754 (1975).
53. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2000) (providing that the Commission may prescribe such
information and documents as necessary and appropriate for the proper protection of investors
and to ensure fair dealing in the security). Annual reports are filed on Form 10-K and Quarterly
reports are filed on Form 10-Q. The real-time disclosure occurs by means of Form 8-K. The items
to be disclosed have traditionally been limited but by Commission proposal and congressional
action in 2002 seem poised to grow dramatically. See supra note 8.
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proxy provision, to all public companies as defined by the 1934 Act.54
These reports are commonly referred to as 10-Qs, 10-Ks, and 8-Ks.
In 1982, the Commission promulgated an integrated disclosure
package using Regulation S-K. 55 In doing so, the Commission
systematized the disclosure package that public companies must
provide. As a result, in addition to the timing of the disclosures, the
Commission regulates the actual content of disclosures. The
regulations are extensive and provide for disclosures arguably
designed to enforce what are basic state law fiduciary duties. The
required disclosures aid directors in performing their governance
functions. The disclosure also aids other monitors, including
accountants, whose work is required by the stock exchanges and the
Commission. As recent corporate announcements about restated
financial statements reveal, these mandated disclosures are detailed
and are therefore potential sources of manipulation and fraud. These
mandated disclosures are also considerably more substantive in
nature than the proxy provisions. They now include more than sixty
items and occupy more than one hundred pages of the federal
rulebook.56
For example, under Regulation S-K, Item 303 (Management's
Discussion and Analysis), the Commission requires registrants'
annual reports to include descriptions of the company financial
conditions, changes in those conditions, and results of operations. 57
The specific categories of required financial information include
explanations of liquidity,58  capital resources, 59 and operational
results. 60
Without going into mind-numbing detail, it is worth
considering one passage of Item 303 to see specifically how the
Commission is using a description of liquidity to enforce, at least
indirectly, management care. To comply with Item 303, the registrant
must identify "known trends or any known demands, commitments,
events, or uncertainties that will result" in material increases or
54. See Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. § 77a-78111) (2000).
55. Proposed Revision of Regulation S-K and Proposed Rescission of Guides for the
Preparation and Filing of Registration Statements and Reports, Securities Act Release No. 33-
6332 (Aug. 18, 1981). For some of the earlier history including the promulgation of Regulation S-
K in 1977 and the Advisory Committee Report of that same year, see LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra
note 41, at 621.
56. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.10-.1016 (2002).
57. § 229.303(a).
58. § 229.303(a)(1).
59. § 229.303(a)(2).
60. § 229.303(a)(3).
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decreases in liquidity.61 Managers who are fulfilling their duty of care
should be concerned about liquidity and the events related to those
changes. Through a requirement that such changes be disclosed, the
Commission is enforcing the substantive duty.
Further, once management identifies the trend, it must
"indicate the course of action that [it] has taken or proposes to take to
remedy the deficiency."62 Again, managers acting to fulfill their duty of
care would presumably resolve to remedy any such deficiency. But, by
forcing managers to disclose the trend and describe how they plan to
remedy it, the Commission is regulating the conduct, not just what
management says about the conduct. Through disclosure can come
substance-here, the duty of care.
Forty years ago, the SEC said that "[the [Securities] Act does
not purport ... to define federal standards of directors' responsibility
in the ordinary operations of business enterprises."63 That view of the
securities laws, despite its dominance for most of the seventy years of
federal securities regulation, does not describe the post-Sarbanes-
Oxley world.
In another part of Regulation S-K, Item 10, the Commission
provides its support for companies that want to include projections
and predictive material in their filings, within certain prescribed
limitations. 64 This requirement is an example of how the Commission
fosters disclosure, and, by doing so, regulates in a duty of care fashion.
While providing companies the option to make predictive disclosures
(an option long denied them under SEC rules65), the Commission
makes clear that management must have "a reasonable basis for such
an assessment."66 Although one might assume that management
would have such a basis before making any predictive statements,
when the Commission spells out the requirement, it prescribes the
requisite and appropriate level of care.
The Commission also requires companies to make mandatory
disclosures in other contexts. Form 8-K's purpose is to provide a
disclosure mechanism for significant events occurring between the
company's quarterly updates. Historically, the list of required 8-K
61. § 229.303(a)(1).
62. Id.
63. In re Franchard Corp., 42 S.E.C. 163, 176 (1964).
64. § 229.10(b)(1).
65. For the Commission Releases, see Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic
Performance, 38 Fed. Reg. 7220 (Feb. 2, 1973); Guides for Disclosure of Projections of Future
Economic Performance, 43 Fed. Reg. 53246 (Nov. 7, 1978). For a short discussion of the
Commission's reluctance to adopt this position, see COX ET AL., supra note 2, at 63.
66. § 229.10(b)(1).
874 [Vol. 56:859
2003] SECURITIES FRAUD AS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 875
updates has been very short (six items) and restricted to significant
occurrences, like a change of control or bankruptcy filings. 67 In the
wake of the Enron scandal, the Commission proposed a major increase
(up to thirteen additional items covering far more of the company's
day-to-day business) in the items requiring interim, immediate
disclosure. The Sarbanes-Oxely Act required the Commission to
promulgate regulations for real-time disclosure, resulting in more
frequent 8-K filings. 68
Finally, the Commission has also adopted various mandatory
disclosure items that arguably regulate the duty of loyalty. For
example, managers must tell shareholders what they are paying
themselves. 69 And the Commission dedicates fifteen pages of the
rulebook to telling management how to do so, providing specific
categories of compensation and exact formulations for the charts in
which management must present the information.70 Here, again,
disclosure is presumably forcing substance in contexts in which
conflicted loyalty might be at issue.
The statutory provisions on short-swing profits reveal a much
more pronounced and direct approach to federal regulation of
corporate fiduciaries. Pursuant to section 16 of the 1934 Act, 71 the
Commission promulgated requirements that managers and directors
file reports to disclose both ownership of company securities 72 and, on
a timely basis, the execution of trades in company securities. 73
Disclosure here is the mechanism for the enforcement of an actual
statutory provision that prohibits insiders from engaging in short-
swing trading transactions. 74 This provision has been interpreted
broadly to force any profits earned by the insider to be returned to the
issuer.75 According to one court, the purpose of this provision is "to
squeeze all possible profits out of stock transactions, and thus to
establish a standard so high as to prevent any conflict between the
67. See, ALPHONSE A. SOMMER ET AL., SECURITIES PRIMARY LAW SOURCEBOOK, pt. H, Form
8-K, Items 1-9 (Matthew Bender & Co.).
68. See supra note 8. In 2000, the Commission adopted Regulation FD, or Fair Disclosure,
to prevent selective disclosure of material company information to certain favored individuals,
like analysts. § 243.101(e). Now, when companies disclose material company information to, for
example, analysts, they must also disclose the information to the general public, which may be
accomplished via a Form 8-K filing.
69. See § 229.404.
70. See id.
71. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2000).
72. SOMMER ET AL., supra note 67, Form 3.
73. Id. at Form 4.
74. § 78p.
75. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943).
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selfish interest of a fiduciary officer, director or stockholder and the
faithful performance of his duty."76 Here, then, the duty of loyalty
connection is explicit. In the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Congress mandated
accelerated reporting under section 16(a) and added a new
disgorgement provision tied to accounting restatements. 77
The responses to the recent corporate crises show that almost
no one is talking about state regulation or law to combat the corporate
governance problems. Instead, Congress has passed legislation to
remedy the situation.78 The President addressed the issue, including
traveling to New York for a speech before a corporate governance
backdrop. The SEC regulations mandated by Sarbanes-Oxley are the
most dramatic regulatory changes affecting corporate governance
since 1934. 79
These proposals reveal both a serious federal emphasis on
governance issues and the continued expansion of the Commission's
role in corporate governance. For example, in addition to proposing a
decrease in the lag time between the end of the quarter and fiscal year
and the date on which the appropriate reports must be filed,80 the
Commission demanded that corporate executive officers vouch for the
financial statements contained in the periodic reports.8' Officers
already had to sign the 10-K, for which personal liability was a
possibility.8 2 The Commission's new requirement, reinforced by
subsequent legislation, goes beyond simply requiring the CEOs and
CFOs "to swear that the numbers they've reported in their financial
76. Id. at 239.
77. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 403, 404, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7261-7262 (West, WESTLAW
through Pub. L. No. 107-204).
78. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 1-1107, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7201-7266.
79. Former SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt, Remarks at the National Press Club (July 19,
2002), available at www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch577.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2003); see also
Harvey Pitt, Remarks at the Meeting of the Economic Club of New York (June 26, 2002),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch573.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2003).
80. Acceleration of Periodic Report Filing Dates and Disclosure Concerning Website Access
to Reports, 67 Fed. Reg. 19895 (proposed Apr. 23, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts 229, 240
& 249).
81. This demand originally occurred as a one-time obligation, required in an unusual
procedural setting by an SEC order pursuant to its powers under section 21(a) of the Act to apply
only to the largest 947 companies. See Order Requiring the Filing of Sworn Statements
Pursuant to Section 21(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/4-460.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2003). The requirement was
extended by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to be a permanent obligation of all publicly held companies.
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 302, 15 U.S.C.A. § (West, WESTLAW, through Pub. L. No. 107-204).
82. See SOMMER ET AL., supra note 67, General Instruction D to Form 10-K.
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reports are correct and that they've left nothing important out."8 3
Managers must sign a statement declaring that they have reviewed
the requisite reports and, where appropriate, discussed them with the
audit committee or board, before determining that the reports are in
fact correct.8 4 The congressional legislation codified much of the
earlier proposal and added criminal penalties.8 5
This provision directly imposes a duty of care on company
managers. It not only makes them agree to a particular disclosure, but
it also tells them what they must do before signing the disclosure
statement. State law has long addressed this issue, as illustrated in
the well-known recent case, In re Caremark International, Inc.
Derivative Litigation.86 The executive officer declaration is, however, a
direct intrusion of federal legislation into what has traditionally been
the province of state law corporate governance.
Note the emphasis here-on officers, not directors. As Alan
Greenspan recently observed, "the state of corporate governance to a
very large extent reflects the character of the CEO."' 7 And, in
recognition of where the locus of today's governance is, federal law
imposes obligations directly on officers, bypassing the intermediaries
of the board.88 A telling example of the federalization of corporate
governance is the section of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that regulates the
fiduciary duty of loyalty by banning corporate loans to executive
officers and directors.8 9 Such a ban was historically part of state
corporate law. 90 In many states the earlier prohibition has been
watered down to a requirement for director approval, and the Model
Business Corporation Act deleted the provision entirely in its 1988
83. See Investor Confidence Measure Applies to 945 Largest SEC-Registered Publicly
Traded Companies, Exchange Act Release No. 2002-96 (quoting Commission Chair Harvey L.
Pitt), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-96.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2003).
84. Id. For a copy of the declaration statement, see id. at app.
85. Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 302, 906, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7241 (West, WESTLAW through Pub. L.
No. 107-204).
86. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
87. T.K. Moby, Greenspan Blasts Infectious Greed, WASH. TIMES, July 17, 2002, at C8.
88. A notable exception is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requirement that audit committees of the
board of directors be responsible for the outside audit of the company, not the company's
management, and that the members of that committee be independent, even if such
independence is not required by state law. § 301, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78j-l. There are also several
provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley that include directors along with officers or executive officers in
their prohibitions (for example for insider trading and prohibiting loans), but the focus on the
new law is more on officers than directors, and even those new obligations on directors are
coming from federal law, not state law that has been seen as having the traditional authority to
define director obligations.
89. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 402, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78(m)k.
90. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. 2D § 47 (1971) (describing the 1969 Model Act and
earlier state law).
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revision. 91 The federal government has now mandated a contrary
view.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act also requires an annual report to be
accompanied by a statement that management is responsible for
creating and maintaining adequate internal controls and that officers
making the required certification have evaluated the effectiveness of
those controls within ninety days. 92 Even more directly, it requires the
companies' chief executive and financial officers to disgorge any
incentive- or equity-based compensation within twelve months of
reports that lead to an accounting restatement. 93 The new federal act
also intervenes in corporate governance by requiring the SEC to
promulgate rules requiring attorneys to report to the chief legal officer
and then the chief executive officer any evidence of a material
violation of the federal securities laws or breaches of a fiduciary
duty.94 Here, then, the federal government has gone over the directors'
heads, rejecting the deference to their prerogative that characterizes
Delaware law. Instead, it has specified officer-level governance at a
level exceeding the state law mechanisms and applied it not just to
securities fraud but to fiduciary duty as well. In doing so, Congress
has explicitly recognized the now-connected nature of federal
securities law and fiduciary duty that we describe in this Article.
b. The Increase in Disclosure Obligations Beyond Mandatory
Disclosure
Apart from the increase in mandatory disclosure accomplished
through direct regulatory intervention defining the reach of line-item
disclosures, and, we argue, the concomitant expansion of federal law
into the corporate governance realm, disclosure obligations have
grown significantly through the antifraud provisions of the 1934 and,
to a lesser extent, the 1933 Act. Generally speaking, misleading
statements and omissions in corporate disclosure statements, whether
voluntary or mandatory, give rise to federal securities fraud liability
claims. The location, so to speak, of the alleged misstatements or
omissions can be the required quarterly and annual reports, but it can
91. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. 3D § 8.60 (1984) (describing thirty-five states that
continue to prohibit loans to directors and/or officers or allow them in limited circumstances).
92. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 302, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7241.
93. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 304, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7243. SEC rules promulgated in 2003
require attorneys to report to an independent board committee if the officer's response is
inadequate.
94. Sec Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245.
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also be a press release, conference call, or any other oral or written
statement made by the company. 95
Companies, of course, make statements because they think it
will benefit their business. Sometimes they make misleading
disclosures to protect their business-for example, by attempting to
prevent premature discussion of a merger that is being negotiated. 96 If
the statement is misleading and material, it will give rise to fraud
liability.97 In some situations, the company managers feel wedged
because adverse business consequences may ensue following the early
release of information. But, in a developed market for information,
they know that if they say nothing once an issue has been publicly
raised, their silence will be taken as confirmation that something is
happening. Of course, in some situations company managers are
anxious to release information (or are driven by a perceived need to
meet the earnings expectations of the market),98 but doing so
prematurely without sufficient qualifying information-for example,
in the context of an upcoming product release--can also result in
fraud liability. 99
Generally speaking, under the securities laws, companies are
liable whenever they misspeak. Absent a duty to disclose, companies
need not speak. 100 On occasion, however, silence can be fraudulent.
This area of the securities realm has also expanded greatly. For
example, silence can be fraudulent in the context of insider trading in
at least five circumstances. First, if insiders, who have fiduciary duties
to their shareholders under state law, have information about the
company and are trading in the company's stock without disclosing
that information, they are liable. 10 1 Second, when insiders tell, or tip
information to someone else, in breach of a fiduciary duty, and the
tippee trades in the company stock and knows or should have known
that the tip was a breach, the duty passes to the tippee, and both are
95. Antifraud liability also attaches to any person who makes a misleading statement, but
our focus here is on the entity, the source of most statements.
96. See, e.g., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 226-30 (1988).
97. Id. at 249-50.
98. See Joseph Fuller & Michael C. Jensen, Just Say No to Wall Street: Putting a Stop to the
Earnings Game, 14 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 41, 41 (2002) (discussing earnings-management cycle);
see also Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst as Agent: Rethinking the
Regulation of Analysts, 88 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2003) (discussing earnings-management
cycle and corporate misstatements in context of analysts' symbiotic relationship with
management).
99. See Hillary A. Sale, Heightened Pleading and Discovery Stays: An Analysis of the Effect
of the PSLRA's Internal-Information Standard on '33 and '34 Act Claims, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 537,
541-49 (1998).
100. Basic, Inc., 485 U.S. at 236 n.14.
101. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968).
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liable. 10 2 Third, if a person (such as an accountant or a lawyer)
received information from the company for a lawful purpose but with
an expectation of confidentiality, that person also inherits a fiduciary
duty, and if she fails to disclose information before trading, she is
liable. 10 3 Fourth, if the trader has information acquired by breach of a
fiduciary duty to someone else (not the shareholder or company whose
shares are being traded) and fails to disclose that information before
trading (i.e., "misappropriates"), the trader is liable. 10 4 And, fifth, if
the trader has information about a tender offer and fails to disclose
that information before trading, the trader is liable even if she
breaches no state law fiduciary duty. 10 5
Selective disclosure to outsiders can be the basis for a duty to
make further disclosure. This duty occurs as a result of Regulation
FD, though it arguably existed prior to it.106 Here, even if the
disclosure occurs for a company purpose and not in violation of a
fiduciary duty, if the information is material, it must be disclosed to
all or none. 10 7
Finally, silence may be the basis for a duty to disclose when
there is a duty to update or a duty to correct. The duty to update
applies to forward-looking information-for example, a projection,
which was accurate when made, and is still alive in the market but no
longer accurate.108 The duty to correct applies to past historical facts,
for example, last year's financial reports in a 10-K report, which it
turns out, were not accurate at the time released,10 9 or when the
company is entangled with false statements made by another. °10 Both
theories are based on common law. Like most securities fraud law, the
Supreme Court has addressed neither. As a result, the exact
application of these duties varies from circuit to circuit, but they
102. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659-61 (1983).
103. Id. at 658 n.17.
104. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 653-59 (1997).
105. Id. at 666-67.
106. Fisch & Sale, supra note 98 (discussing Regulation FD and the history of the
Commission's regulation of analysts).
107. 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100-103 (2000).
108. See Weiner v. Quaker Oats Co., 129 F.2d 310, 315-18 (3d Cir. 1997). The PSLRA
enacted safe harbors for forward-looking statements in certain circumstances and specified that
the offered protection for those statements did not create a duty to update. As a result, some
courts have refused to impose a duty to update post-PSLRA. See, e.g., Phillips v. LCI Int'l, Inc.
190 F.3d 609, 621 (4th Cir. 1999).
109. See, e.g., In re Healthcare Compare Corp. Sec. Litig., 75 F.3d 276, 282-83 (7th Cir. 1996)
(holding that company has duty to correct if information about declining patient enrollments
were true at the time a statement to the opposite effect was made).
110. Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 163 (2d Cir. 1980).
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cannot be excluded from a description of the universe of disclosure
obligations.
c. The Dramatic Expansion in the Scope of Federal Liability Relating
to Disclosure
Even more dramatic than the expansion of mandatory
disclosure and the ancillary liability for half-truths and silence is the
broadened scope of liability once a misstatement is established. A
simple comparison to common law fraud makes the point. At common
law, the basic liability for misstatements extended only to those in
privity with the fraud feasor who could prove actual reliance on the
fraud. Under the 1933 Act, liability extends specifically to various
parties named in the Act-not just to the registrant and its directors,
but also to accountants and underwriters involved in the offering.
These people are experts and, as described above, gatekeepers. These
parties, who have acted wrongfully as defined by the 1933 Act, are
directly enriched by the securities that were sold. Thus, there is a link
between the plaintiffs' harm and the defendants' benefit. Liability is
premised on their actual role in the offering document in question or
sale of a security without a required document.
There are eight express causes of action under the Acts'11 and
four implied causes of action under the 1934 Act.'1 2 The express
actions under the 1933 Act relax the common law requirements as to
reliance and scienter, 113 for example, but the size of their plaintiff
group is limited either by a requirement that purchasers be in privity
with the issuer or other seller in the transaction or by a limitation
that the shares held be connected to the questioned offering."14 Under
111. The 1933 Act provisions are as follows: § 11 (liability for registration statement
misstatements and omissions); § 12 (liability for misstatements and omissions in public
prospectuses and sales of unregistered securities); § 15 (liability for controlling persons). The
1934 Act provisions are as follows: § 9 (liability for manipulations of securities on stock
exchanges); § 16 (liability for short-swing profits); § 18 (liability for misleading statements in
certain SEC-filed reports); § 20 (liability for controlling persons); § 20A (liability for insider-
trading with contemporaneous traders).
112. 15 U.S.C. § 78j, § 10b, Rule 10b-5 (2000), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2000) (liability for
misleading statements and omissions); 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a), § 14(a) (1994) (liability for fraud in
proxy solicitations); 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e), § 14(e) (1994) (liability for fraud in tender offers); 15
U.S.C. § 78m(e)(1), § 13(e)(1) (1994) (liability for fraud in connection with issuer repurchases).
113. The section 12 causes of action are strict liability claims. The section 11 cause of action
is negligence-like because it provides all defendants, except the issuer, with a due diligence
defense.
114. Exposure for liability under section 11 is specifically limited to the offering price, or,
more or less, to the consideration that the defendants as a group received in the transactions
giving rise to the claim. Section 12(a)(2) requires privity, although the courts are divided as to
how to interpret that requirement.
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the 1934 Act, the key express causes of action operate in similar
fashion with two significant and practical limitations. First, liability
attaches only to individuals who actually speak or are directly
responsible for the misstatement or omission. Second, the express
private cause of action has a double reliance requirement that has
blocked effective use in private actions. 115
In this void, the cause of action responsible for most of the
litigation under the securities laws is court-created, an implied right
of action pursuant to Rule 10b-5.116 Liability under this implied right
of action is more expansive than common law liability in at least three
ways that are relevant to its use in the corporate governance context.
First, any person who purchases or sells securities in connection with
a material misstatement or omission may sue if they are damaged
thereby." 7 The case law makes clear that courts interpret this cause
of action broadly such that fraud feasors can be liable for the losses
not just of the person with whom they trade, but also for the losses of
anyone who traded in reliance on the misleading statement." 8 In a
10b-5 context, the plaintiffs might, for example, claim that they lost
money in a trade. Someone else presumably made money, but that
offsetting trader is probably not the defendant. In fact, unless she is
also part of the class, she may actually be a stranger to the 10b-5
litigation, and, of course, she will not be required to contribute to any
settlement. The defendants are exposed to all of the plaintiffs' trading
losses even though the defendants did not necessarily have an
offsetting trading benefit. Of course, the defendants may have
indirectly benefited-for example, through a compensation package
tied to short-run market performance. Either way, the connection
between the fraud and the harm is indirect and through the market,
with a potentially severe impact on the defendants.
Second, the Supreme Court's acceptance of the fraud on the
market doctrine to establish reliance has facilitated plaintiffs'
litigation in a governance context.11 9 Under this doctrine, plaintiffs
In recent years, the courts have begun to narrow the realm of liability under these causes of
action by deploying a doctrine known as tracing. See Hillary A. Sale, Disappearing Without a
Trace: Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Securities Act, 75 WASH. L. REV. 429, 430-33 (2000).
Although arguably contrary to the terms of the statute, the tracing doctrine functions in a
privity-like fashion.
115. 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (2000).
116. See Herman & McLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983) (noting that the implied
nature of a 10b-5 action was beyond "peradventure").
117. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, Co., 401 F.2d 833, 858-62 (2d Cir. 1968) (describing the
"in connection with" requirement).
118. See id.
119. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-47 (1988).
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who did not, for example, read a public document containing a
misstatement or omission, can utilize a rebuttable presumption
allowing them to plead and prove that they traded in an active and
efficient market like the New York Stock Exchange. 120 If they succeed
in doing so, their reliance on the market incorporating the alleged
misstatement or omission is presumed. 121 This doctrine makes class
actions by plaintiffs more attractive and, thus, expands the potential
for lawsuits focused on governance issues.
Third, damages for 10b-5 claims brought in a developed market
can be large and the means for determining them seem, at least at
first glance, to be accessible to judges and litigants. In a typical
securities fraud suit, the damages depend on the size of the class
period and the magnitude of the change in the stock price.1 22 The
longer the class period and the more dramatic the price change in the
stock after the "truth" is revealed, the larger the size of the total
potential recovery. 23 Individual recovery, however, is relatively small
because it is spread over a large class of shareholders. 124
The class-action mechanism was created to address this type of
collective action problem, although, as originally conceived, it was to
be used largely in the civil rights arena. 125 The theory is that small
individual recoveries lead to a lack of lawsuits in contexts where
enforcement of the law is warranted, but due to resource constraints
are likely to happen only through private attorneys general. 26 By
definition, then, the litigation is lawyer driven and aimed more at
deterrence than compensation.127 When translated into complaints,
the focus becomes governance, with fraud as a hook.
120. Id. If the market is "thin," the presumption does not apply. See, e.g., Cammer v. Bloom,
711 F. Supp. 1264, 1285-87 (D.N.J. 1989) (utilizing a five-factor test to reject the presumption of
reliance in non-stock exchange transaction).
121. Basic, Inc., 485 U.S. at 241-47.
122. See generally Bradford Cornell & R. Gregory Morgan, Using Finance Theory to Measure
Damages in Fraud on the Market Cases, 37 UCLA L. REV. 883, 883 (1990) (arguing that finance
theory is useful for measuring damages in fraud-on-the-market class actions); Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611,
611 (1985) (explaining the law of damages in securities cases).
123. The most common measure of damages in a Rule 10b-5 action is the difference between
the price paid and the true value at the time of the initial transaction, but since that value is not
readily available, the drop in price around the time the truth was revealed is used as a proxy for
the difference between price paid and true value.
124. Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 STAN. L.
REV. 1487, 1487-90 (1996).
125. See 3B JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.02-6 (2d ed. 1995)
(noting that Rule 23 was enacted for the "specific purpose" of ensuring that class actions would
be available to enforce civil rights statutes).
126. See id. 23.02-1.
127. See id.
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Securities litigation shares these characteristics with much of
today's litigation under state corporate law. This litigation also shares
with its state counterpart the downside risk that comes from
representative suits, when the incentives of the party acting for the
entire group, often the lawyer, might diverge from the interests of the
group. 128 Federal courts encountering securities fraud claims face the
same problem that the Delaware courts do-in hindsight, anything
might look bad. 129 The problem is separating what looks like fraud
today from what was actually fraud at the time of the misstatement or
omission. The courts developed the scienter element to draw this line,
however unsuccessfully.1 30
Several years of growth in the market and in the number of
public companies, combined with growth in the number of lawsuits
and in recoveries against accounting firms, led to attempts to restrict
the class-action mechanism for securities lawsuits. The major initial
proponents of the legislation were members of the accounting
industry.' 3' The debate in Congress, too lengthy to recount here, was
128. For discussions of the role of class actions in business litigation generally, see John C.
Coffee, The Unfaithful Champion: Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, 48 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 5, 5 (1985) (noting the perception that shareholder litigation was no longer
respected as a monitor of corporate management); Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and
Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337, 390-92. This discussion of the
conflicts of lawyers extends to a general debate about the role of the legal system in achieving
broader societal goals as well. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing
Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
509, 564-66 (1994); Robert C. Clark, Why So Many Lawyers? Are They Good or Bad?, 61
FORDHAM. L. REV. 275, 301-02 (1992); Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A
Demand Side Perspective, 49 MD. L. REV. 869, 916 (1990). But see Lucian Arye Bebchuk,
Litigation and Settlement Under Imperfect Information, 15 RAND J. ECON. 404, 414 (1984); Avery
Katz, The Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits on the Settlement of Litigation, 10 INT'L REV. OF L. &
ECON. 3, 25-27 (1990).
The reality, at least with securities litigation, is much more complicated. See Denise M.
Martin et al., Recent Trends IV: What Explains Filings and Settlements in Shareholder Class
Actions, 5 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 122, 156-57 (1999); Joel Seligman, The Merits Do Matter: A
Comment on Professor Grundfest's "Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal
Securities Laws: The Commission's Authority", 108 HARV. L. REV. 438, 442-44, 448-49 (1994)
(noting that little proof existed for claims that securities litigation was frivolous or increasing
and that the number of lawsuits filed had not increased significantly); Charles M. Yablon, A
Dangerous Supplement? Longshot Claims and Private Securities Litigation, 94 Nw. U. L. REV.
567, 593-96 (2000) (rejecting as insufficient general arguments that securities litigation is
frivolous and that cases are only of strike-suit nature).
129. See, e.g., Serabian v. Amoskeag BankShares, Inc., 24 F.3d 357, 367 (1st Cir. 1997)
(noting that courts must guard against the "assumption that the defendants must have known of
the severity of their problems earlier because conditions became so bad later on").
130. See, e.g., In re Time Warner Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 268-69 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting reasons
for the use of scienter element).
131. See Janthe Jeanne Dugan, Did You Hear the One About the Accountant? It's Not Very
Funny, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2002, at Al (noting that the savings-and-loan "debacle" prompted
hundreds of lawsuits against accountants who paid $1 billion in penalties to the government and
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largely anecdotal in nature and focused on stereotypical lawsuits
against a high-tech company sued after a drop in its stock prices.1 32
According to the reform proponents, these lawsuits were abusive
strike suits. 133 Although little empirical evidence existed then or now
to support those claims, the arguments prevailed. 13 4 The result was
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,135 with its limits
on pleading, discovery, scienter, damages, and other aspects of
securities litigation.
When securities litigation is used to regulate the relative rights
of shareholders, directors, and officers in corporate governance, the
federalism doctrine also acts to restrain the litigation. This tension
between the fraud-based mechanism and corporate governance is
revealed, in part, in the refrain in securities fraud opinions that the
cause of action is not properly used to target mismanagement. 136 The
Supreme Court addressed the role of federal litigation and regulation
in the traditional state law context in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v.
Green.137 In Santa Fe, the Court focused on whether federal judges
were allowing securities fraud claims to determine when directors'
actions were unfair to minority shareholders.' 38 This corporate
governance issue, concerning the relative rights of directors and
shareholders, had been established at state law. The Court was
unwilling to federalize it absent explicit congressional action. Indeed,
in Santa Fe the Court clearly attempted to cabin the role of federal
law in corporate governance and management contexts.
Ironically, the actual concern might well have been the tension
caused by the use of a fraud-based mechanism as a corporate
governance mechanism, which, in turn, grew to fill the growing hole in
state governance law. The Court's concerns in Santa Fe were not
dissimilar to those expressed about securities litigation and, more
responded by forming a coalition to channel money to Washington, donating $39 million through
various mechanisms from 1989 to 2001); id. (asserting that, with the help of Harvey Pitt,
accountants fought for the PSLRA, which makes it more difficult for them and other non-
company officials to be sued).
132. See, e.g., Sale, supra note 99, at 543 n.22 (collecting and citing comments from
legislative history).
133. See id. at 553 n.74 (collecting from legislative history testimony about inappropriate
plaintiffs' counsel practices).
134. See Hillary A. Sale, Judging Heuristics, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 903, 915 n.57 (2002)
(collecting and citing literature about the merits of the reform debate).
135. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
136. See, e.g., Colby v. Hologic, Inc., 817 F. Supp. 204, 206 (D. Mass. 1993).
137. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
138. Id. at 472-79.
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generally, corporate litigation.139 As described above, this litigation is
lawyer driven. By definition, in a class action, few of the plaintiffs
know the details of the claims or the nature of the litigation. Many
have expressed the concern that lawyers, not clients, decide whether
and when to file claims, and that lawyers, not clients, decide when to
settle the claims. As a result, the concern is that lawyers' needs and
interests dominate, rather than those of the client. Commentators
have posited that the result is frivolous litigation and inappropriate
settlements. 140 To some extent, the accuracy of this argument depends
on whether one focuses on the corporate governance element of the
claims and the correlative deterrence effect of the claims and
settlements.
Despite the principles articulated in Santa Fe, this Article
describes a dramatic growth in the role of federal law in regulating
officers and directors. The growth arguably runs afoul of the principles
expressed in Santa Fe, because, after all, state law gives directors free
rein to determine how much or how little officers can do. When federal
law increases the role of officers it also diminishes the corporate
authority of directors to determine the governance structure of the
business. Simultaneously, this action increases the role of
shareholders by permitting them (rather than the directors) to hold
officers accountable.
There is, however, room to fit this expanding federal role
within the parameters set forth in Santa Fe. In that case, the Court
expressed its federalism concern that absent a clear indication of
congressional intent, it would not override "established state policies
of corporate regulation."14 1 State law actually says very little
affirmatively about what officers are supposed to do (in contrast to the
relatively well-developed roles of directors and shareholders).
Congress expressed its clear intent, through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
to regulate the conduct of officers, in the context of the duties of care,
loyalty, and good faith.1 42 The data on securities fraud litigation
described below reveal the ways in which the federal complaints are
attempting to plug those holes.
139. See id. at 478-79 ("In addition to posing a 'danger of vexatious litigation which could
result from a widely expanded class of plaintiffs under Rule 10b-5,' Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S., at 740, this extension of the federal securities laws would overlap and
quite possibly interfere with state corporate law.").
140. See supra note 128.
141. Sante Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 479.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 77-94.
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II. DATA ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE LITIGATION
A. The Different Faces of Shareholder Litigation
The extent to which securities fraud litigation functions
effectively as a tool of corporate governance can be seen by comparing
it to other shareholder litigation that performs a corporate governance
role, particularly the other types of representative litigation-
derivative suits and class actions based on fiduciary duty and brought
under state law. Shareholder litigation in the corporate governance
context consists of at least five categories of suits pursuant to state
and federal law: state fiduciary duty derivative suits; state statutory
claims, such as those based on inspection of records or election
disputes; state fiduciary duty class action acquisition suits; federal
securities fraud suits; and federal insider trading actions.
State-Law Fiduciary Duty Derivative Cases Raising,
Principally, Loyalty Allegations. The classic shareholder litigation
case is one based on breach of fiduciary duty brought by a shareholder
against an insider who has engaged in a transaction with the
corporation that benefits the insider more than the corporation. These
cases are usually derivative actions in which any recovery goes to the
corporation, rather than to the individual plaintiffs. Given the lack of
incentive to an individual plaintiff that necessarily exists in such a
situation, lawyers have long been the dominant players in this
litigation and there have been long-running debates about the
possibility of strike suits.' 43 In a recent study of Delaware complaints
(the "Thompson and Thomas Study"), there were about fifty derivative
cases a year brought against public corporations in Delaware courts.
Almost two-thirds of those alleged conflict of interest or other loyalty
claims. About 20% of the complaints alleged improper financial
reporting or a failure to supervise. 144
Direct Shareholder Claims for Violations of State Corporations
Statutes. The fiduciary duty claims just described usually derive from
the common law. That law developed on a case-by-case basis to protect
shareholders from possible abuse by those who have control of the
corporation's assets. Fiduciary duty suits make up the great majority
of shareholder litigation, but a variety of specific claims are possible
under provisions of the corporations code. The Thompson and Thomas
Study found that about 20% of complaints filed in the Delaware
143. See generally Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55 (1991) (examining the effectiveness of shareholder litigation and arguing
that it is an ineffective instrument of corporate governance).
144. Thompson & Thomas, supra note 10, at tbl.4.
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Chancery Court asserted such claims. 145 The most common claims,
accounting for about thirty-five cases per year, were those in which
shareholders sought to inspect corporate books. Claims relating to
dissolution and receivers came next with about twenty-five cases a
year, and cases raising director determination questions produced
about twenty complaints per year on average. Claims seeking to force
a shareholder meeting or seeking appraisal averaged about ten
complaints per year. These cases are usually direct claims by
aggrieved shareholders and have a different impact than the
representative claims that are the focus of this Article.
State-Law Fiduciary Duty Class Actions in Acquisitions. By far
the largest number of state shareholder litigation claims against
publicly held companies are fiduciary duty claims brought as class
actions arising out of acquisitions. The Thompson and Thomas Study
shows that such class actions dwarf derivative suits in terms of the
number of suits filed, with about four hundred cases a year, or about
eight times the number of derivative suits filed against public
corporations. 146 These suits have some similarities to traditional
derivative suits and some notable differences. In the typical state-law
acquisition case, either managers announce a merger or another
fundamental change in control, or a second company makes a hostile
bid. 147 The shareholders respond by suing to limit the directors'
freedom to act or not to act. 148 The most common count in the
complaints states that the directors have breached their duty to
maximize share value. 149 The desired result, then, is a higher price for
the transaction. Although a federal Williams Act claim is possible in
such cases, the claims are usually brought under state law as a class
action against the company and its directors.150  Additional
145. Id. at tbl.3.
146. Id. at tbl.2.
147. Under state law, shareholders must vote on a merger, but only if submitted to them by
the board. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(a)-(c) (2001). Shareholders are able to accept or reject
a tender offer made to them by a hostile bidder who has not gained the assent of the board, but
defensive tactics such as poison pills that the board can implement, when coupled with a
staggered board structure, effectively limit the use of tender offers without the board's consent.
148. This type of suit is usually based on fiduciary duty, the subject of the Delaware data set
described earlier. See note 144 supra.
149. The court in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182
(Del. 1986), held that directors are required to maximize shareholder value, but only if the
company is up for sale. In subsequent cases, the Delaware courts have said that stock-for-stock
mergers with public companies without a controlling shareholder do not trigger this fiduciary
obligation. A Revlon-type claim was made in about one-third of all acquisition cases, but did not
produce much in the way of affirmative relief. See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 10.
150. In contrast to the data reported in our federal case database in Part II, the state suits
are against directors, not officers. See infra Part II.B 2.
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consideration for the transaction occurs in approximately 12% of these
cases.151 Another 12% of the cases result in other substantive relief,
including additional disclosures and/or attorneys fees. 152 Most cases,
however, are dismissed within a year of filing, without damages or
other relief.15 3
Securities Fraud Class Actions. The securities fraud class
actions brought in recent years follow a typical pattern. These cases
are brought under the federal securities laws, generally following a
company's correction of a prior earnings misstatement.15 4 Of course,
the company's stock price falls when the new earnings numbers are
released. The stock price fall represents the alleged damages. 155 These
cases are almost entirely federal, filed against the company and its
officers, and last somewhat longer than the state acquisition cases.
Moreover, when these cases result in settlements, rather than
dismissals, they produce smaller recoveries than the state acquisition
cases. 156
Further, these earnings management cases combine elements
of both loyalty and care claims and might have been made in state
court. As discussed above, the theory of these cases is that the
managers have caused the corporation to do something that has made
the corporation's shares less valuable and, thereby, harmed the
shareholders. Unlike the traditional state court conflict of interest
case, the insider is not on the other side of the transaction from the
corporation and its shareholders. However, the insider may receive
some indirect benefit from the action, perhaps related to additional
consideration.
Insider Trading Cases. The insider trading cases resemble the
conflict transaction cases in that both involve alleged conflicts
between shareholders and management. Here, however, the allegation
is one of the management engaging in insider trading with a
shareholder, rather than the transaction conflicts described above.' 57
151. Most of the cases that produce additional relief occur in the context of a controlling
shareholder who has cashed out the publicly held minority interest on terms set by the majority
shareholder.
152. Thompson & Thomas, supra note 10, at tbl.6.
153. More than half of the acquisition fiduciary duty cases (113 of 213) were dismissed
without prejudice with an additional 5% dismissed with prejudice. Id. Slightly more than 10%
were still open. See id. at tbl.6.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 125-130.
155. See supra text and table accompanying note 171.
156. The median recovery in the acquisition cases is about $5 million, with about 12% to 14%
in additional consideration.
157. The company can engage in insider trading, but it is usually individual participants
who do so.
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These claims are almost always brought under federal law, although
more often by the government (the Commission for civil claims, or the
U.S. Attorney for criminal claims) than by private litigants. Since
these are not representative claims, but direct claims, they have less
in common with the more common securities fraud or derivative
claims. In our data set of complaints there are allegations pertaining
to the trades of insiders, but these allegations appear to be raised to
meet the pleading standard for the scienter element of the
misrepresentation claim and not for the direct recovery on insider
trading.158 Actual insider trading claims are hard to prove because the
courts have attached a privity-type requirement to the claims that, as
applied, requires the class action to have proposed plaintiffs who
traded company securities contemporaneously with the defendants.
B. Characteristics of the Securities Fraud Class Actions
We have undertaken a detailed examination of securities fraud
class action complaints filed in 1999 for the purpose of examining to
what extent these cases seek to redress claims that relate to corporate
governance. We created our data set from the list of securities class
action filings for 1999 as found on the Stanford class action
clearinghouse website. 159 We limited our examination of complaints to
those filed in district courts within the Second, Third, and Ninth
Circuits. We defined our sample to include the courts within the
Second and Ninth Circuits, because these circuits are widely
recognized to be the most prominent courts today in securities
litigation. The Third Circuit includes Delaware, the site for the state
law database to which we make comparisons in this discussion. 160 The
total cases filed in those three circuits make up approximately half of
all cases filed in that year.161
158. See infra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
159. STANFORD LAW SCHOOL SECURITIES CLASS ACTION CLEARINGHOUSE, available at
http://securities.stanford.edu (last visited Mar. 22, 2003).
160. For a complete description of the state law database, see Thompson & Thomas, supra
note 10.
161. Our data set of 86 complaints is smaller than the total number of cases on the website.
We have excluded non-class actions and cases transferred out of the three jurisdictions we chose.
We have also eliminated from the data set cases that were listed on the website as securities
fraud cases, but which, upon examination, turned out to be based on other causes of action.
Finally, we were unable to locate complaints in a few of the cases.
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1. The Companies Sued
Most of the companies named in these suits were incorporated
in Delaware. About three-fourths of the companies for which we
identified an American state of incorporation had their legal home in
Delaware; for the non-Delaware companies there were almost as many
from abroad as there were from other American states. 162 Although
the sample is not large enough to support findings of a significant
statistical difference between the Delaware and non-Delaware
corporations, it suggests that the comparison of federal and Delaware
complaints discussed in this part should cover most cases in which
state and federal corporate governance suits could overlap.
California was the headquarters for half of the companies in the
sample; companies sued were more likely to be listed on NASDAQ than
the NYSE; and more companies were in high-tech industries than
traditional manufacturing. These results are consistent with the story
told about the securities fraud class action, for example, in the debate
surrounding the 1995 Act163-and they suggest that the federal class
action suits have a somewhat different flavor than the state fiduciary
duty cases-even if both relate to corporate governance.
For example, nationally, approximately 15% of all corporations
are headquartered in California, and 11% are headquartered in New
York. 164 The complaints in the Thompson and Thomas Study break
down in a similar manner for California companies, with a somewhat
larger number for New York. 65 In our database, however, more than
three times as many companies headquartered in California are sued
as compared to New York-headquartered companies.1 66 Although we
162. The totals were as follows: Delaware-thirty-seven; unspecified-thirty-two; Nevada
and New Jersey-two each; California, Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and
Virginia-one each; Israel-three; Canada-two; and British Virgin Islands and Bermuda--one
each.
163. See, e.g., John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform: The Genesis of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 BUS. LAW. 335 (1996).
164. See Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation
Choice: Evidence on the "Race" Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1795,
1814 (2002) (reporting 15% of American corporations headquartered in California from
Compustat database and 11% in New York).
165. Thompson & Thomas, supra note 10, at n.147. California-headquartered companies
made up 15.9% of the seventy-six companies for which a principal office could be identified, the
same percentage as reported in Subramanian, supra note 164, at 1814.
166. The numbers (for eighty-six cases) were as follows: California-forty-three; New York-
twelve; Arizona-seven; New Jersey-six; Pennsylvania-three; Washington-two; Colorado,
Delaware, Massachusetts, Nevada, Texas, and the Virgin Islands-one each; Israel-two; and
Antigua, Canada, and Hong Kong-one each; two were unspecified. These numbers reflect the
circuit court jurisdictions from which the complaints were taken. Only nine companies were
headquartered outside the three circuits in the study.
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cannot draw firm conclusions given the limited nature of our database
and jurisdictional requirements, California-headquartered companies
do seem to represent a disproportionate number of companies sued in
federal cases-at least relative to their national incorporation rate.
The data, then, raise an interesting question for further study.
If, as we posit, securities litigation is playing largely a care-based
corporate governance role, it is possible that these young companies
lack some of the internal governance structures of their more
established counterparts. If securities fraud claims are working to
address some of those issues, then the lawsuits against those
companies may be playing an ex post deterrence role. Or it may be, as
many have claimed, that start-up, high-tech companies are
disproportionately and inappropriately sued.
Our data on exchange listing and line of business also show
other differences between companies sued under federal and state law.
Companies listed on NASDAQ outnumbered those with stock traded
on the New York Stock Exchange by an almost two-to-one margin in
our database of federal class action complaints. 167 In contrast,
fiduciary duty suits in Delaware were more often brought against New
York Stock Exchange companies. 168 The federal data set has a greater
representation of high-tech companies than the state fiduciary duty
data set. Computers, software, and information technology made up
about one quarter of the sample with telecommunications
representing an additional 15%.169 These data are consistent with the
industry base in earlier discussions of federal securities fraud class
action suits but differ from the industry identification of the state law
database, which is more spread out across the economy. 170 These data
probably reflect the segmentation of the lawsuit world with state
litigation focusing on acquisitions and loyalty claims and federal suits
focused more on earnings changes and care-based concerns in high-
tech companies, although both are corporate governance claims.
167. The totals were as follows: NASDAQ-fifty-two; NYSE-twenty-seven; other public
companies-five; and unspecified-two.
168. Thompson & Thomas, supra note 10, at tbl.4 (reporting that NYSE companies
outnumbered NASDAQ companies by more than two-to-one for all cases filed and five-to-four for
lead cases after multiple suits per transactions were consolidated).
169. The numbers are as follows: computers, software, and information technology-twenty-
one; telecommunications-thirteen; manufacturing and business service-each with nine;
retail-eight; finance-seven; pharmaceuticals-four; healthcare, real estate, and
biotechnology-each with three; recreation and apparel-two each; and personal services and
airlines-each with one.
170. Thompson & Thomas, supra note 10, at n.148 (reporting that internet computing made
up about 15% of the companies sued and telecommunications represented an additional 6%).
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2. Securities Fraud Class Actions and the Perils of Representative
Litigation
Securities fraud class actions are representative claims in
which a class member seeks to bring the litigation on behalf of a large
group of affected class members. These suits share a number of
characteristics with other types of representative litigation, such as
derivative suits, that have led to various rules to limit their abuse and
the possibility of strike suits. The debate over the 1995 Act centered
on this element. We do not seek to repeat or even summarize that
debate here, but our study does offer some additional information
relevant to that debate on two items: the extent to which federal suits
follow precipitous drops in the company's stock price and the extent to
which repeat law firms bring these suits. Our analysis of the federal
complaints reveals that complaints are often premised on allegations
of fraud related either to a significant drop in earnings or other
accounting allegations. The majority of complaints in our sample
identify a precipitous drop that precedes the suit. Where a percentage
drop was reported, the median percentage decline was 54%.171 These
types of claims are consistent with today's major corporate scandals,
like Enron and WorldCom. They are also consistent with the climate
of earnings management, about which much has been written
recently. 172
Table 1. Drop in Share Value Prior to Suit
Percentage Drop No. of
Reported Prior to Complaints
Suit (of 48)
80-99% 8
60-79% 15
40-59% 11
20-39% 13
1-19% 1
State and federal representative shareholder litigation share
some characteristics. For example, both federal securities fraud class
171. As reflected by these drops, the sample was decidedly skewed toward allegations of
misrepresentation that led plaintiffs to pay too much (eighty-one complaints) as opposed to
allegations that led them to sell for too little (four complaints); one was unspecified.
172. See, e.g., Fuller & Jensen, supra note 98, at 41-43 (positing that earnings management
and officer interaction with analysts is partly responsible for the current accounting
manipulation crisis).
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actions and state fiduciary duty claims in acquisitions are filed very
quickly, both often involve multiple lawsuits for the same
transactions, and both are brought by an identifiable, small group of
lawyers. 173 Our data on law firms are consistent with those of other
studies. Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes, and Lerach is the dominant
law firm for plaintiffs, representing plaintiffs in thirty of the eighty-
five complaints for which this information was available. 174 Four of the
next five firms are also in the top dozen firms bringing shareholder
fiduciary duty claims in Delaware. 175 The Thompson and Thomas
Study showed that sixteen firms filed more than 75% of Delaware
fiduciary duty class actions, although Milberg, Weiss had a less
dominant role in that set of complaints. Our data set, being complaint
focused, does not reveal how the lead plaintiff provisions of the 1995
Act have evolved or even whether they have been effective in reaching
the targets at which they were aimed. The other studies now available
reveal that the provisions have had little, if any, impact to date. 176
173. These points are among those discussed in Thompson & Thomas, supra note 10, at tbl.9.
In the state law data set, for example, there were about 800 lawsuits brought in 214 acquisitions.
Almost 70% of the class action lawsuits in the state law complaint database were filed within
three days of the questioned transaction, for example, three days after the date of an acquisition
announcement.
174. One complaint was incomplete on this question. In other studies, Milberg, Weiss has
been reported to have been involved in about half of all post-Reform Act cases that were settled
through 2002. See Laura E. Simmons, Post-Reform Act Securities Lawsuits: Settlements
Reported Through December 2001, at 10 (2002), available at
http://www.cornerstone.comlframrec.html. Bajaj et al. report a smaller involvement for Milberg,
Weiss at about one third of post-reform cases. See Mukesh Bajaj et al., Securities Class Action
Settlements: An Empirical Analysis 13 (Nov. 16, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
authors).
175. Milberg, Weiss (ninth), Weiss & Yourman (seventh), Stull & Stull (sixth) and Abbey,
Gardy & Squitieri (fourth) are in the top ten among firms bringing fiduciary duty lawsuits in
Delaware. See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 10, at tbl. 12. Wolf & Haldenstein is twelfth. The
law offices of Bruce G. Murphy is further down the state list but is still within the top twenty. Id.
176. See SEC, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS ON THE FIRST YEAR OF
PRACTICE UNDER THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995 (1997), available at
http://www.sec.gov/ncws/studies/lreform.txt (last visited Jan. 20, 2003); Elliott J. Weiss,
Comment, The Impact to Date of the Lead Plaintiff Provisions of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 561, 563-72 (1997).
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Table 2. Plaintiffs' Law Firms
Plaintiff Firm No. of Complaints Filed
Milberg, Weiss 30
Weiss & Yourman 13
Stull & Stull 11
Wolf & Haldenstein 9
Bruce G. Murphy 9
Abby, Gardy & Squitieri 8
3. Claims Made in Securities Fraud Class Actions
Our data set reveals some dramatic differences between
securities fraud class actions and other shareholder litigation.
Specifically, we find that securities litigation suits are most often
brought against officers, not directors. In addition, securities litigation
is based on specific substantive allegations, unlike the acquisition-
based claims of fiduciary duty suits. Finally, the location of the alleged
misleading statement in documents discussing the ongoing nature of
the business and the length of the class period provide evidence of the
corporate governance focus of securities fraud litigation.
Securities fraud claims are directed against individuals in their
capacity as officers, not directors. State law fiduciary duty complaints
are brought against directors, but federal claims are made against
officers. Often, of course, the same individuals serve in both positions,
but the position in which they are sued is telling with respect to the
function that each law seeks to serve. All the complaints in our data
set specify the entity as a defendant, and four sue only the entity. Of
the eighty-two complaints that identify individual defendants, eighty-
one name the chief executive officer ("CEO") as a defendant, and sixty
name the chief financial officer ("CFO"). Nine name the chief
operating officer ("COO"), and thirty-one name vice-presidents who do
not have one of the "chief' positions.
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Table 3. Corporate Positions of Individuals Named as Defendants
Defendant's Status Subtotal No.
Total Cases That Name Defendant 86
Chief Executive Officer 81
CEO but Not Chair 11
CEO & Chair 26
CEO, Chair & President 24
CEO & President 20
Nonexecutive Chair 21
President 7
Chief Financial Officer 60
CFO & Other 46
CFO & Director 10
CFO & President 3
CFO & Chair 1
Chief Operating Officer 9
Chief Technology Officer 3
Vice-President (& Not Named Above) 31
Outside Directors 21
& Prospectus/Registration Statement 9
& Proxy 2
Other Settings 10
No Outside Directors Beyond Officers _61
In contrast to the state-law cases, only twenty-one securities
fraud complaints name any outside directors as defendants.1 77 Nine of
these twenty complaints are suits brought pursuant to 1933 Act
registration statements, under which there is specific statutory
liability for directors.178 To summarize, few of the cases include any
directors beyond those who are also officers, and even in the few cases
in which outside directors are named, not all outside directors are
177. In the state law database, all of the suits name directors, but none names officers who
are not directors.
178. Section 11(a) of the 1933 Act names directors among the five named categories of
individuals who can be liable under the Act. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 11(a)(2), 48 Stat. 74,
82 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(2) (2000)).
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sued. 179 Instead, only those outside directors who actually acted in a
manner consistent with responsibility for the misstatement or
omission are named as defendants. 80
This difference in defendants between the state and federal
claims is consistent with the difference in the governance focus of the
claims. The federal cases focus on the failure of managers, principally
officers, to fulfill their management obligations. Put in fraud terms,
the complaints allege that the managers committed fraud by saying
one thing while knowing another or recklessly failing to know another.
That claim is akin to one asserting a failure to manage properly.
Securities fraud claims address officer behavior in managing
the company and in their duty of care. Notably, the subject matter of
the alleged misrepresentations encompasses the duty of care/duty to
monitor governance aspects of traditional corporate law and reflects
the care-based concerns expressed in the debates about recent
corporate scandals. The majority of the alleged misrepresentations
focus on accounting misrepresentations. These misrepresentations
arguably represent the earnings-management phenomenon that
others have documented in today's public companies.' 8 ' The theory is
that corporations focus on earnings announcements and short-term
stock prices in response to analyst demands. The market, whether
appropriately or not, focuses on the earnings announcements because,
at least in theory, analysts review and cleanse them. The process
becomes cyclical. Companies make earnings estimates, and analysts
promote the numbers. Companies then have to meet those numbers.
As the end of the quarter approaches, and the companies are not close
to the numbers, the companies must choose between coming clean and
continuing to assert the numbers. The more unrealistic the estimate,
the greater the pressure to meet it. Some estimates, in fact, become
unattainable, and an unsustainable cycle of ever-increasing earnings
announcements and share prices begins. 8 2 Eventually, of course, the
companies have to come clean, and that act is the one documented in
the complaints. Fuller and Jensen posit that analysts' focus on
predictions, short-term numbers, and earnings data, thus, influences
managerial decisions, resulting in changes in management focus that
179. Two of the remaining ten complaints named only one outside director, and two named
only two.
180. For example, these outside directors are often said to have engaged in insider trading
during the class period.
181. Fuller & Jensen, supra note 98, at 41-43.
182. See id. at 42-43.
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may impact operational decisions and harm long-term corporate
profitability. 183
As Table 4 reveals, the plaintiffs have alleged various
accounting misrepresentations that, according to our review of the
complaints, fit into this earnings-management category.
Approximately 88% of the complaints (seventy-six of eighty-six)
include allegations that involve company misrepresentations about
earnings or sales or production problems tied to a failure to meet
earnings predictions. Many complaints include more than one type of
misrepresentation and each is depicted here.
The second prominent category of misrepresentation alleged
involves acquisitions. About 43% of the complaints (thirty-seven of
eighty-six) include cases involving this type of allegation.
Interestingly, these allegations can also be categorized as earnings-
management allegations. For example, companies without revenue
growth have an incentive to acquire other companies with positive
revenues. Companies wishing to be acquired have an incentive to try
to keep their stock prices high, at least until the acquisition occurs.
These are the types of stories the complaints tell.
Table 4. Subject Matter of Misrepresentations
Type of Misrepresentation No. of Complaints
Accounting and ,arnings
Accounting-General 54
Sales/Product Cycle 43
Accounting-Revenue Recognition 31
Production Problems 18
Accounting-Understating Expenses 6
Accounting-Restatement 1
Acquisition
Company Made Acquisition 24
Company Was Acquired 8
Failed Acquisition by Company 3
Failed Acquisition of Company 2
Securities fraud claims arise out of statements made in periodic
reports and other statements reflecting management's stewardship of
the business. In the majority of the cases, the specific claims are
183. See id.; see also Jill Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, Analyzing the Analysts, 88 IOWA L. REV.
(forthcoming 2003) (discussing analyst conflicts of interest and earnings-management
complications).
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framed in terms of allegations of misleading statements or omissions
occurring in the ongoing operation of business, like regularly filed
reports, press releases, and conference calls.184 In a majority of the
complaints the alleged misstatements and omissions (forty-six of
eighty-six) occur in a 10-K or 10-Q filing. The alleged
misrepresentations in periodic reports often overlap with allegations
as to registration or proxy filings; only ten arise solely from a
registration statement, one solely from a proxy filing, and three from a
tender offer. And the allegations are not limited to situations involving
mandatory disclosures: More than three-fourths of the complaints
refer to misstatements appearing in press releases and to other
voluntary disclosures.18 5 These claims arise in the regular course of
business, conversations with the media and required reports, or
situations implicating day-to-day decisionmaking and, largely, the
duty of care. Thus, most of the cases involve corporate governance-
type allegations.
Table 5. Place of Misstatement as Alleged in Complaint
Location Subtotal No.
Mandatory Disclosures
Section 13 Disclosures
10K 32
Alone 4
& 10Q 16
& Registration Statement 3
& 10Q & Registration Statement 5
& 10Q & Tender 1
& 10Q & 8K 1
& 10Q & Proxy & Registration St 1
& 8K & Proxy 1
10Q 38
Alone 10
& 10K 16
& Proxy 1
184. See infra tbl.5 accompanying note 185.
185. Sixty-eight of the eighty-six complaints listed statements appearing in press releases.
The categories are not mutually exclusive and the same complaint can record more than one. For
example, a complaint alleging a misstatement in a 10-K and 10-Q would appear twice in the
count in this table. Most complaints listed a variety of places among the choices described in
Table 5.
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Location Subtotal No.
& 8K & Proxy 1
& 10K & Registration Statement 5
& Regis Statement 2
& 10K & 8K 1
& 10K & Tender 1
& 10K & Proxy & Registration St 1
8K 4
& 10Q & Proxy 1
& 10Q & 10K 1
& Proxy 1
& 10K & Proxy 1
Registration Statements/ Prospectus _ _ _ _ 24
Alone 10
&10K 3
&10Q 2
& 10K & 10Q 5
& Proxy 3
& Proxy & 10K & 10Q 1
Proxy Statement __ ..... 9
Alone 1
& Registration Statement 3
& 10K & 8K 1
& 10Q 1
& 8K 1
& 10Q & 8K 1
& Registration St & 10K & 10Q 1
Tender Offer Disclosure 3
Voluntary Disclosure
Press Release 68
Analyst Report 30
Conference Call 26
Media Interview 20
Conversation with Analysts 18
Analyst Conference 17
Media Article 10
Letter to Shareholders 8
Road Show 4
Trade Conference 4
Other 4
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Securities fraud complaints often allege that a
misrepresentation occurred for insider benefit. As a result, they often
appear to contain loyalty-type claims.18 6 For example, some complaints
rely on the trades of insiders in company stock to support these
allegations. Others focus on executive compensation. Consistent with
our care/governance findings, these allegations are merely hooks, not
substantive claims. Insider trades, for example, serve as proxies for
scienter-an alleged motive for managers to commit fraud-rather
than evidence of the fraud itself.18 7 The use of insider trades as a hook
for fraud was increasing before the 1995 Act, but its use has grown
since that time, in part to meet the increasingly restrictive pleading
standard imposed by Congress and welcomed by the courts.188
Securities fraud class actions usually cover a class period that
includes significant numbers of company shareholders. Federal claims
may be limited in their ability to serve a governance function if those
who have standing as purchasers and sellers during the class period
have interests that diverge from the interests of the complete set of
shareholders. The length of the class periods, in combination with the
average turnover in company stock, offers one method to evaluate the
severity of this problem. In the complaints covered in our sample, the
median length of the class was ten months. Twenty-eight of eighty-six
complaints alleged class periods extending for one year or more.
Table 6. Length of Class Period
186. About 37% of the complaints in our study do not include either insider trading or
executive compensation allegations, relying mostly on the mismanagement allegations tied to
mandatory and voluntary disclosure. Twenty-five (29%) list executive compensation in the
complaint, and thirty-nine (45%) list insider trading counts. (Ten of the cases include both and
therefore are included in each count.)
187. See Hillary A. Sale, Judging Heuristics, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 903, 925 (2002).
188. Id. at 924-25.
Length of Class Period (in No. (of 86 Cases)
Months)
<1 9
1-6 21
7-12 24
13-18 8
19-24 10
25-30 1
31-36 6
37-42 2
Indefinite 1
Unknown 4
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The turnover rate of share ownership has increased
substantially during the last fifty years, and recent data put it at
100% on an annualized basis. 8 9 Of course, some shareholders hold for
a longer period, and some shares trade more than once, resulting, for
example, in a divergence between current shareholders and those with
standing to sue. But in a universe of corporate stock ownership
dominated by institutional investors owning diversified portfolios,
there may, however, be an alignment of interest between the two
groups.
Further, even if the overlap between current holders and those
with standing were smaller, the small per share award in most
securities fraud class actions suggests a deterrence function that is
more consistent with corporate governance than with compensating a
class of purchasers or sellers. 190 A significant percentage of the relief
in securities class actions, 20 to 30%, goes to attorneys, and the
remaining relief is increasingly small relative to the alleged loss in
corporate value. 191
4. Transactions Generating Both State and Federal Lawsuits
Only a small fraction of the companies sued in the Delaware
data set were also sued in our federal study.' 92 There were about a
189. See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, DATA LIBRARY, NYSE STATISTICS ARCHIVE (reporting
year-to-date annualized monthly turnover rate of 100% for April 2002, 98% for May 2002, 101%
for June 2002, and 106% for July 2002), at http://www.nyse.com/marketinfo/marketinfo.html
(last visited Aug. 14, 2002). For a discussion of turnover rates over a longer period, see Seymour
Smidt, Long-Run Trends in Equity Turnover, J. PORTFOLIO MGMT., Fall 1990, at 66 (reporting
turnover rates on the New York Stock Exchange as higher in the early 1900s (200-300% per
year), lower from 1940 to 1965 (12-24%), and increasing to 73% in 1987); see also The Impact of
Institutional Investors on Corporate Governance, Takeovers, and Capital Markets: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 101st Cong. 68
(1989) (reporting increase in turnover of New York Stock Exchange listed stocks from 19% in
1955 to 55% in 1988).
190. See A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with
Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 945-47 (1999).
191. See Laura E. Simmons, Post-Reform Act Securities Lawsuits: Settlements Reported
Through December 2001, CORNERSTONE RES., at 6 fig.3 (2002) (showing that the median
settlement as a percentage of estimated damages for post-1995 suits is 5%, the percentage
declines as the absolute amount of damages increases, and the percentage has declined since
1995), at http://www.cornerstone.com/pdfs/settlements.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2003).
192. Twenty-four companies were sued in both Delaware and in federal court during the
same time period. We estimate this number to be 7 to 10% of the companies in the two data sets.
It is approximately 7% of the 290 public companies sued in Delaware for breaches of fiduciary
duty in those two years. The total number of companies sued for securities fraud is a bit larger
and includes non-Delaware incorporated entities. Estimating from the overall sample of
Delaware companies in our economy, of the 400 companies that were sued for securities fraud in
those two years, approximately 60% (about 240) would be incorporated in Delaware, so 10% of
them would be included in the overlap set.
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dozen settings in which there were federal and state suits relating to
the same transactions. Most of the overlapping cases remain open in
Delaware, an unusual characteristic, because more than 90% of the
Delaware class actions have been resolved.193 These overlapping cases
are also unusual in that only two have produced any kind of relief and
two others were resolved with no relief.194 These data contrast with
the overall recovery rate in the Thompson and Thomas Study where
about 25% of cases result in additional consideration or other relief.1 95
Thus, the overlap cases look different than the state law cases
generally, and where there is an overlap they tend to fall more into
the federal pattern.
The dominance of federal litigation in the overlap cases can
also be seen in another data point. There are twenty-one cases in the
state data set that allege improper financial records or misleading
statements that could possibly support federal claims. Of the four
cases in this group that have provided affirmative relief, three are
linked to federal securities suits. In two of those, the dollar amount
paid in settlement for the state suit went directly from the corporation
to the settlement of the federal suit.
III. SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION'S ROLE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
All of the shareholder suits discussed in Part II reflect a shared
purpose of countering the agency costs inherent in managers running
a corporation in which they have only a small interest. The basic
concern is that management has misused its position with respect to
corporate assets. As discussed above, the state law default norm
centralizes corporate power in the hands of management-more
193. Thompson & Thomas, supra note 10, at tbl.14 (reporting the median time to resolution
for an acquisition case raising a fiduciary duty claim to be 287 days). It is not surprising that the
state cases generally settle more quickly than the federal suits. First, the Delaware courts pride
themselves on dealing with cases efficiently and quickly. Second, the 1995 Act incorporated
significant procedural hurdles for the litigation of federal claims. So, for example, plaintiffs
wishing to survive dismissal in federal court must meet restrictive pleading standards. Those
standards evolved from pre-1995 case law in which the plaintiffs were allowed discovery to do so.
Now, however, the plaintiffs are barred from discovery. The process of meeting the standard and
surviving dismissal can take quite a long time, and settlement discussions are off the table until
that point. That the state court cases with related federal cases do not fall into this pattern,
however, suggests the greater resemblance of these overlap cases to federal as opposed to state
cases.
194. See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 10.
195. After consolidating the multiple suits into their underlying controversies, the 1,000
complaints resulted in 349 controversies, of which only 84 resulted in relief of any sort. Of those,
41 resulted in relief with additional consideration. The other 43 resulted primarily in rescinding
some corporate acts or other substantive relief, additional disclosure, or attorneys' fees.
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specifically, directors-and these forms of litigation check the abuse of
that position.
As the federal disclosure obligations have increased, they have
begun to provide the basis to enforce duty of care obligations that in
the past might have been enforced under state law. In either
jurisdiction the allegation would be that the managers' actions have
harmed shareholders by decreasing the corporation's value. Federal
law, of course, allows only those shareholders who bought and sold to
recover for this loss, but that limit seems to reflect concern for
vexatious litigation more than a substantive belief about the
culpability of managers. In theory, state law duty of care litigation
continues to afford relief to these shareholders, but as disclosure and
securities fraud litigation have expanded, and as Delaware has raised
the bar for care claims, the balance has shifted to a larger federal
role. 196
Fiduciary duty and securities fraud litigation have much in
common. Both occur after the fact and through a lawsuit brought by a
self-appointed individual, ostensibly a shareholder but in reality an
attorney acting as a private attorney general, motivated by the fees to
be earned in successful suits. Further, litigation in the two settings
works with roughly the same set of incentives. No one shareholder has
sufficient interest to make litigation worthwhile. Collectively,
however, the damage is sufficient to warrant recovery. The attorney's
job is both to create and file the complaint and to help the class
plaintiffs understand and follow the litigation.
It is not surprising that the lawyers may have mixed incentives
in both settings. Those delegated to act as class plaintiffs must
represent both the class and themselves, at least in the context of fees.
And, both sets of claims suffer from parallel litigation agency cost
problems to the extent that the economic incentives of the attorney for
the plaintiffs are not closely aligned with the economic incentives of
the class as a whole.
The overlap between the governance motives in both sets of
litigation is striking. Today's federal securities fraud claims are
largely efforts to recover from what could be care claims at state law.
To be sure, elements of the duty of loyalty appear in the context of, for
example, insider trading by a defendant or efforts to increase
executive compensation. But the main story line of these complaints is
focused not on recovery of a wrongful benefit received by the insider,
as in the Delaware cases, but on recovery of the entire loss that can
196. See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2002).
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arguably be said to flow from the managerial mistake, overvaluation,
or misrepresentation.
Arguably, then, these federal cases are working to fill the hole
in Delaware law brought about by the lack of liability for, and
concomitant inability to sustain, suits for breaches of the fiduciary
duty of care. Unlike their loyalty-focused, state law counterparts, the
federal cases detail shareholders' complaints that the officers'
stewardship of the business has not been what the owners would like
it to be. The question raised is the one currently in the news every
day-what did the CEOs at WorldCom, Enron, Qwest, Xerox, and
others actually know about their respective company's financial
situation and when did they know it? And, if as some claim, they did
not know, then why not? The latter question raises the same issues as
the duty of care/duty to monitor, with the duty of loyalty in the
background.
To the extent that federal securities fraud and state fiduciary
litigation are both constraints on possible abuses of managers'
positions, it is worth comparing the relative manner in which the two
types of litigation function. The increased growth in the role of federal
law in corporate governance can be explained by several advantages
that federal litigation has relative to state litigation. First, the
disclosure basis for federal securities law provides other ancillary
benefits beyond shareholder litigation that contribute to its use as the
preferred response when problems like those in 2002 occur in
corporate governance. Disclosure can aid several parties in the
corporate monitoring context. In addition to assisting shareholders,
disclosure aids directors in their monitoring function and can be an
important support for accountants as they undertake the monitoring
role that is a key component of corporate governance. Given these
multiple uses, it is not surprising that disclosure law has grown
dramatically. Delaware conceded much more of corporate governance
than it may have anticipated when it forwent the affirmative use of
disclosure obligations or, through the exculpation clause, the
affirmative regulation of managerial care. Moreover, even if Delaware
were now to decide to reenter that arena, the Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act of 1998 would likely prevent it from doing
so.197
Second, the federal focus on the behavior of officers is much
more in line with the reality of modern corporate America. As our
business enterprises have become larger and more complex, increased
197. Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p, 77v(a), 78bb,
and 78u-4(b)(3) (2000)).
VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW
power has passed to chief executive officers and the line hierarchy
that flows from that person. Directors, acting collectively, continue to
have a role in crises and sometimes in picking a successor to the
CEO,198 but a governance system based on directors is less efficacious
now than early in the last century. Thus, the federal layer of law is
more important than before.
For Delaware to expand its focus on officer conduct it would
have to amend its jurisdictional statute to include officers rather than
just directors. In 1977, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected Delaware's
use of quasi in rem jurisdiction to reach corporate directors and
officers, holding that the shares in a Delaware-based corporation did
not meet the constitutional minimum contacts standard.199 The
opinion distinguished Delaware's quasi in rem jurisdiction from
jurisdiction based on fiduciary status.200 The Delaware legislature
responded by passing a statute stating that the corporation's
registered agent serves as the directors' agent, thereby creating a form
of implied jurisdiction.2 1 The statute, however, does not apply to
officers. This statutory gap may explain the lack of lawsuits naming
officers, but it does not explain the legislature's choice not to include
officers as corporate fiduciaries who ought to be subject to litigation in
the Delaware court system to enforce their corporate governance
functions. Delaware could, of course, remedy this situation by
including officers in the jurisdictional statute and removing the
jurisdictional barrier to lawsuits against officers who otherwise lack
the requisite contacts with Delaware to establish traditional personal
jurisdiction. 2 2 Or, as in other areas, Delaware could continue to
concede this area of the law to the federal government. 20 3
Third, disclosure questions, the focus of federal law, can be
more easily handled under the current legal regime than questions
alleging a duty to supervise and monitor, which are the basis of care
review under state law. Delaware's implementation of section
198. For a traditional discussion of the role of directors emphasizing their role in crises, see
MILES MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY 101-12 (1971)
199. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 195, 216-17 (1977).
200. Id. at 214.
201. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114(a) (2002); see also Armstrong v. Pomerance, 423 A.2d
174, 179 (Del. 1980) (holding that statute met constitutional requirements).
202. This solution has been proposed by two Delaware judges. See William B. Chandler III &
Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the American Corporate Governance System:
Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One Small State, U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003).
Our inclusion of this point derived from a suggestion from Vice-Chancellor Strine.
203. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition (Nov. 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with authors) (arguing that pressure from the federal government is the only relevant form of
pressure on Delaware's corporate law choices).
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102(b)(7) and judicial focus on the failure to supervise has made it
very difficult for it to be a presence in determining the care portion of
corporate governance. When infectious greed overwhelmed our
historical guardians, Delaware was at a relative disadvantage in
acting. Federal law has been stepping into that vacuum for years, and
recent legislation expands the federal corporate governance role-
most strikingly in the care context. State law continues to have the
core role for duty of loyalty issues, but it now explicitly shares
corporate governance with the federal government.
Fourth, the damages question is much more accessible to
litigants and judges under federal securities fraud law than under
state fiduciary duty law. In a federal claim, the plaintiffs must link
the alleged misstatements or omissions to their damages. They do so
by complaining about the difference in the price at which they bought
(typically high because of inflation from misleading statements) and
the lower, actual value of the stock with which they are stuck after the
truth, or breach of the duty of care, is revealed. In the state claims
shareholders complain of the decreased value of the corporation
because of the manager's action. Often the damages would be
measured by the difference between the same two figures-the
inflated value of the company before the disclosure of the wrongful act
and the lower value after the wrongful act was revealed. Here,
however, there is not a purchase or sale to mark the prices as
distinctly.
The policy question does not necessarily differ from that which
arises in the federal cases. If managers, through a wrongful act, cause
the corporation to appear to be worth more than it is, then some
shareholders who bought at the "inflated" price have been harmed by
the decline in price from the inflated figure. For each buyer, there was
a seller who presumably was not one of the defendants. Those sellers
then made a profit on their sales, but are not part of any litigation
about the inflation of the price or forced to return the profits to the
buyers. The debate then becomes whether managers should be liable
to those who have lost because of the improper acts, without netting
out the benefit that has accrued to other members of the public, a
common result in tort suits but one which can lead to an arguably
incorrect measure of damages in cases involving securities. This
debate is common in the securities fraud damages context and is
connected to whether one perceives the purpose of the damages to be
compensation or deterrence. If deterrence is the purpose, and what is
to be deterred is bad governance behavior, then the debate has
arguably been focused on the wrong issues.
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This debate has been the subject of many other articles2 4 and
was, in part, resolved by Congress in the PSLRA. In that legislation,
Congress arguably affirmed the deterrence aspect of damages paid by
individuals to the covered class, but created certain statutory
mechanisms to limit the total damages paid.205 The appropriate
measure of damages is by no means clear, but the easier measure of
damages is certainly a prime attraction of the federal forum for
plaintiffs and their lawyers.
Fifth, given that both state fiduciary duty litigation and federal
securities fraud litigation raise possible litigation agency cost issues, it
is worth examining the relative checks that are in place to respond to
those possibilities. At this point the federal checks are more developed
than the checks in the state system. Federal law, for example, has
been in the vanguard in developing lead plaintiff provisions. If such
provisions were effective, they would respond to some of the litigation
agency cost concerns.
Much of the debate over the reform of the securities laws
focused on the scienter element.20 6 This element functions to screen
cases in a manner consistent with the way in which state law
regulates the fiduciary duty of care. As a result of the exculpation
statutes mentioned earlier, managers are liable under state law only
where their acts are intentional or attributed to a lack of good faith or
loyalty. In the federal law claims, particularly since 1995, plaintiffs
have deployed individual breaches of the duty of loyalty (insider
trading or executive compensation) as a hook for the scienter element,
or as a means to allege the requisite intent to hold the individual
defendants and the corporation liable for claims suffered by all who
traded on the market at the wrong price. 207 This Article reveals,
however, that the underlying claim is generally one of
mismanagement or a breach of the duty of care.
204. See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson, The Measure of Recovery Under Rule 10b-5: A Restitution
Alternative to Tort Damages, 37 VAND. L. REV. 349 (1984) (discussing courts' use of both the tort
concept of legal causation and the fraud concept of unjust enrichment in Rule 10b-5 cases, and
noting that the remedy of unjust enrichment is well suited to federal securities laws that have
both compensatory and deterrent purposes); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal
Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611 (1985) (applying to federal securities cases a
rule of damages based on optimal deterrence levels).
205. The key change on damages is a provision requiring that plaintiffs plead and prove that
their losses were in fact caused by the alleged fraud. For articles discussing the PSLRA's
provisions on damages, see Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities
Fraud, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 639 (1996), and Robert B. Thompson, Simplicity and Certainty in the
Measure of Recovery Under Rule 10b-5, 51 BUS. L. REV. 1177 (1996).
206. See Sale, supra note 187, at 905-14.
207. See id. (collecting all opinions recounting insider trades since 1995).
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The under examined aspect of this litigation is the expanding
role of disclosure. Over time, mandatory and voluntary disclosure
pursuant to the federal securities laws has increased dramatically. As
the quantity of disclosure has increased, so has the litigation over its
quality. The original premise for requiring disclosure was to decrease
informational asymmetries and thereby to improve market efficiency
through accurate information, while stopping short of creating a body
of federal corporate law. State law was to remain the monitor of the
shareholders' relationship with corporate management and only
marginally be the focus of disclosure discussions. 208 In reality, federal
law now occupies the space originally reserved for the states-
monitoring corporate managers through disclosure.
Although, in general terms, disclosure is a good thing, it is not
necessarily entirely good or a good regulatory mechanism for corporate
governance claims. First, disclosure is an indirect way to regulate
managerial behavior. As discussed above, disclosure is, at best, a
monitor of what managers say, not what they do. The two may be
linked only at the margin. Second, disclosure can, as the recent cycle
reveals, create pressure for more disclosure-truthful or not.
Disclosure then is a double-edged sword. Truthful disclosures work to
decrease informational asymmetries. Fraud increases them. More
disclosure can lead to pressure for more disclosure. In a world where
analysts and others depend on releases of company information, the
expectation and appetite for more disclosure grows with each new
disclosure. In addition, the pressure to meet the predictions and make
the disclosures accurate increases. Yet, the current corporate climate
reveals that, short of a major market turnaround, it is not clear that
the pressure will produce accurate disclosures. In that world, then, the
disclosures are of little value except as ex post litigation links. And,
third, if managers are truthful about their shortcomings, the
securities laws presumably offer no protection for breaches of the duty
of care, no matter how egregious. The remaining question for further
discussion, then, is whether the disclosure approach is sufficiently
efficacious, and if not, whether we should recognize the strong role of
federal law in monitoring corporate governance and reformulate it to
do so in a more direct fashion.
IV. CONCLUSION
Corporate governance, once almost the exclusive domain of
state law, is now very much a function shared by the federal and state
208. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
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governments. State law continues to define the skeleton of the
corporate governance system, but when it comes to filling out the body
of that system, we now have a functional division of monitoring
between the state and federal governments. State litigation remedies
focus on claims against directors for failing to adhere to their duty of
loyalty. Federal law remedies need a disclosure hook but are usually
claims against officers for breaches of the duty of care or monitoring
during the day-to-day running of the corporation. As corporations
have evolved, increasing in size and specialization, Delaware has
turned away from the duty of care and focused instead on the duty of
loyalty. Today's SEC is using its disclosure-based power to regulate
that duty of care-for example, by making officers certify the financial
statements of each quarter. The result of this two-tiered system is to
augment the presence of the federal system in the corporate
governance realm and to decrease the importance of state corporate
law to the more limited and sporadic set of acquisition and conflict
transactions. Now the question is whether the choice we have made
indirectly is a good one and whether we should proceed to regulate
corporate governance more directly at the federal level.
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